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Abstract
This paper uses a structural model to show that foreclosures played a crucial role
in exacerbating the recent housing bust and to analyze foreclosure mitigation policy.
We consider a dynamic search model in which foreclosures freeze the market for non-
foreclosures and reduce price and sales volume by eroding lender equity, destroying
the credit of potential buyers, and making buyers more selective. These effects cause
price-default spirals that amplify an initial shock and help the model fit both national
and cross-sectional moments better than a model without foreclosure. When calibrated
to the recent bust, the model reveals that the amplification generated by foreclosures
is significant: Ruined credit and choosey buyers account for 25.4 percent of the total
decline in non-distressed prices and lender losses account for an additional 22.6 percent.
For policy, we find that principal reduction is less cost effective than lender equity
injections or introducing a single seller that holds foreclosures off the market until
demand rebounds. We also show that policies that slow down the pace of foreclosures
can be counterproductive.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E30, R31.
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Foreclosures were one of the dominant features of the U.S. housing downturn. From 2006
through 2013, approximately eight percent of the owner-occupied housing stock experienced
a foreclosure.1 Although the wave of foreclosures has subsided, understanding the role of
foreclosures in housing downturns remains an important part of reformulating housing policy.
The behavior of the housing market concurrent with the wave of foreclosures is shown in
Figure 1. Real Estate Owned (REO) sales — sales of foreclosed homes by lenders — made
up over 20 percent of existing home sales nationally for four years. Non-foreclosure sales
volume fell 65 percent as time to sale rose. Prices dropped considerably, with aggregate
price indices plunging a third and non-distressed prices falling by a quarter.
This paper uses a structural model to argue that quantitatively matching national and
cross-sectional features of the bust requires that foreclosures play a significant role in exac-
erbating the bust. Indeed, in our calibrated model we find that the effect of having more
homeowners with a foreclosure flag on their credit record and increased buyer choosiness
due to the presence of foreclosures together account for 25.4 percent of the total decline
in non-distressed prices and that the reduction in lending stemming from default-induced
lender losses accounts for an additional 22.6 percent. Our model implies that foreclosures
have far greater equilibrium effects than those found in micro-econometric studies, which use
highly localized fixed effects and absorb much of the city-level variation reduction in supply
and demand that is at the heart of our structural analysis. The role played by foreclosures
opens the door to various foreclosure mitigation policies, and we use our model to compare
several such policies. Our policy analysis reveals that both lender equity injections and
a government facility to strategically hold foreclosures off the market are highly effective,
while principal reductions similar to those pursued by the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) are less cost-effective. Furthermore, if household liquidity shocks are per-
sistent, slowing down foreclosures can prolong the bust to the point that doing so becomes
counterproductive.
We analyze an equilibrium search model of the housing market with random moving
shocks, undirected search, idiosyncratic house valuations, Nash bargaining over price, and
endogenous conversion of owner-occupied homes to rental homes. The model builds on a lit-
erature on search frictions in the housing market, notably Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995),
Krainer (2001), Novy-Marx (2009), Ngai and Tenreryo (2014), and Head et al. (2014). We
add a mortgage market with a representative competitive lender facing a regulatory capi-
tal constraint and costly equity issuance, as well as mortgage default, whereby underwater
homeowners default if hit by a liquidity shock, to this workhorse model. The mortgage
sector in our model is related to recent research that models the interaction of the banking
1All figures are based on data from CoreLogic described in detail below.
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Figure 1: The Role of Foreclosures in the Housing Downturn
0
2
4
6
8
%
 o
f O
us
ta
nd
in
g 
Lo
an
s
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
90+ Days Delinquent In Foreclosure Process
A: Delinquent and In−Foreclosure Loans
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
%
 o
f H
ou
sin
g 
St
oc
k
0
10
20
30
%
 o
f S
al
es
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
REO Share of Sales (L Axis) Foreclosure Completions (R Axis)
B: Foreclosures and REO Share
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f P
ea
k
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Price Index − All Price Index − Non−Distressed REO Sales
Existing Home Sales Non−Distressed Sales
C: Price and Transactions Relative to Peak − Whole U.S.
Notes: All data is seasonally adjusted national-level data from CoreLogic as described in the appendix. The
grey bars in panels B and C show the periods in which the new homebuyer tax credit applied. In panel C,
all sales counts are unsmoothed and normalized by the maximum monthly existing home sales while each
price index is normalized by its separate maximum value.
2
sector and housing market, including Elenev et al. (2016), Greenwald et al. (2018), Hedlund
(2016a, 2016b), Hendlund and Garriga (2019), and Paixao (2017).
Foreclosures have three distinguishing characteristics in our model: They cause losses
for lenders and reduce lender equity, REO sellers have higher holding costs, and individuals
who are foreclosed upon cannot immediately buy a new house. We show that foreclosures
dry up the market for non-distressed sales and reduce volume and prices through three main
equilibrium channels. First, reduced equity pushes lenders against their capital constraint
and causes them to ration mortgage credit. This prevents some buyers from being pre-
approved for a loan, which we call the lender rationing effect. Second, because foreclosed
upon homeowners are for a time prevented from purchasing due to the foreclosure flag on
their credit, foreclosures further reduce the number of buyers in the market relative to the
number of sellers. We call this the foreclosure flag effect. Both the lender rationing effect and
foreclosure flag effect result in an imbalance of buyers and sellers, reducing the probability
that a seller contacts a buyer and lowering equilibrium prices. Typically, foreclosures are
thought of as an expansion in supply; our model emphasizes that foreclosures also reduce
demand. Third, the presence of distressed sellers increases the outside option to transacting
for buyers, who have an elevated probability of being matched with a distressed seller next
period and consequently become more selective. This choosey buyer effect endogenizes the
degree of substitutability between REO and non-distressed sales.
In conjunction with the effect of foreclosures on prices, default amplifies the effects of a
negative shock: An initial shock that reduces prices puts some homeowners under water and
triggers foreclosures, which causes more price declines and in turn further default. Lock-in
of underwater homeowners also impacts market equilibrium by keeping potential buyers and
sellers out of the market, increasing the share of listings which are distressed. Endogenous
conversion of owner-occupied units to renter-occupied in response to the increase in demand
for rental units provides an important countervailing force.
We calibrate our model to match the nation-wide price decline, sales decline, REO share,
and aggregate number of foreclosures from 2006 to 2013. The model fits a number of moments
that are not direct calibration targets, including the decline in non-distressed prices. We use
our model to quantitatively decompose the sources of the price decline. The choosey buyer
and foreclosure flag effects together account for 32.3 percent of the decline in aggregate
prices and 25.4 percent of the decline in non-distressed prices. We find that credit rationing
associated with weakened lender balance sheets can explain an additional 27.1 percent of
the decline in aggregate price indices and an additional 22.6 percent of the decline in non-
distressed prices. Only 40.6 percent of the decline in aggregate prices and 52.0 percent of the
decline in non-distressed prices is accounted for by an exogenous and permanent shock to
3
aggregate prices that we interpret as a bursting bubble. These amplification effects are far
more substantial than those found by micro-econometric studies of foreclosure externalities.
Such studies compare the highly local effect of foreclosures on neighboring prices and find
minor effects; we find more substantial effects because our structural approach allows us to
analyze market-wide equilibrium effects that are absorbed into the constant in micro studies.
To further validate the extent to which foreclosures can account for the bust, we add a
parsimonious amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity to our model and evaluate its ability
to explain cross-sectional moments relative to a model without default. In particular, we
allow cities, formally core-based statistical areas (CBSAs), to differ in their initial loan
balance distribution, their unemployment rate, and the size of the preceding boom, assuming
that the persistent component of the price decline in the bust is proportional to the boom.
The calibrated model fits a number of cross-sectional moments despite the fact that most
parameters are calibrated to pre-downturn moments and that these cross-sectional moments
are not used in the calibration. In particular, the model does a good job of explaining
quantitatively why cities with a larger boom had a more-than-proportionally-larger bust,
which our model attributes to foreclosure. By contrast, a model without default does not
explain these cross-sectional patterns and has a poorer fit because the size of the bust is
proportional to the size of the boom.
Finally, we use the model to quantify the equilibrium impact of a number of government
policies aimed at ameliorating the crisis, including principal reduction, equity injections, a
facility to purchase foreclosures and hold them off the market until demand rebounds, and
regulations to slow down the pace of foreclosures. To our knowledge, the only other papers
to analyze foreclosure policy in a quantitative equilibrium model are Hedlund (2016b), who
studies making non-recourse mortgages recourse, and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2017),
who consider debt forgiveness programs in a model with no price-default spiral. We first
show that the effectiveness of slowing down the rate of foreclosure completions depends on
the rate at which homeowners cure by regaining the ability to pay the mortgage or becoming
above water. If the cure rate is fast enough, slowing down the rate of completions can be
effective at limiting the amount of default. However, this policy also lengthens the crisis,
which has a negative impact on prices. If the cure rate is sufficiently slow – which is likely
the empirically-relevant case in a crisis – the effect of lengthening the crisis can dominate
and slowing down the rate of completions can actually exacerbate the crisis. Second, we
compare the equilibrium effects of three different government interventions to ameliorate the
housing bust that operate on different margins: lender equity injections, homeowner principal
reduction, and a government facility to purchase distressed homes, maintain them off the
market, and re-introduce them once demand rebounds. We find the government facility to be
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highly cost-effective since it directly addresses the imbalance of supply and demand caused
by foreclosures, which supports higher prices and reduces default. This in turn improves
lender balance sheets, which further reduces the severity of the crisis. Government equity
injections are also quite effective, while principal reductions have stronger aggregate effects
than previous micro-econometric studies would suggest but are still the least-cost-effective
of the policies we consider due to imperfect targeting.
Our analysis has a few limitations which one should be mindful of when interpreting the
results. First, we consider only liquidity-driven default and do not consider a household’s
incentives to strategically default. Our model is a good approximation to the 2000s, as the
literature has found that strategic default was limited in the crisis.2 However, the absence of
strategic default means that our model is not well suited to consider policies like the complete
elimination of foreclosure, which would likely lead to widespread strategic default and cripple
lender balance sheets. This pushes us to focus on ex post policies that would not dramat-
ically change strategic default incentives if implemented carefully. Second, given our focus
on a building a rich, structural framework of housing market dynamics and lender balance
sheets, we do not fully model the household’s dynamic budget constraint and non-housing
consumption. Our approach yields useful insights about several prominent foreclosure poli-
cies, but it does limit our ability to consider some others like interest rate reductions (which
we do our best to consider in an appendix) or alternate mortgage designs that work through
the household budget constraint. Third, because we do not model the household’s budget
constraint, we abstract from general equilibrium effects such as the impact of tax or debt
financing needed to pay for foreclosure policies or the effect of such policies on equilibrium
interest rates. Despite these limitations, our framework delivers quantitative insights re-
garding the mechanisms driving housing crises and offers clean economic intuitions about
the relative cost-effectiveness of various policies in stemming a price-default spiral given a
particular funding scheme and level of government expenditures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents facts about the
downturn across metropolitan areas. Section 2 introduces our basic model of the housing
market, and Section 3 describes the calibration of the model. Section 4 explains and quanti-
fies the forces at work in the national model, and Section 5 evaluates the model’s ability to
explain cross-sectional moments about the bust. Section 6 considers foreclosure policy, and
2Ganong and Noel (2019b) show that essentially all default by non-investors was liquidity triggered.
Bhutta et al. (2017 ) estimate that the median non-prime borrower does not strategically default until
their equity falls to negative 74 percent. Similarly, Gerardi et al. (2017) find that there were few strategic
defaulters in the PSID as most defaulters do not have the assets to make a mortgage payment and maintain
their consumption. The largest estimate of the share of defaults that are strategic is 15 to 20 percent (from
Experian Oliver-Wyman). See also Elul et al. (2010) and Foote et al. (2008).
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Figure 2: Price and Sales in Selected Cities With High Levels of Foreclosure
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Section 7 concludes.
1 Empirical Facts
The national aggregate time series for price, volume, foreclosures, and REO share presented
in Figure 1 mask substantial heterogeneity across metropolitan areas. To illustrate this,
Figure 2 shows price and volume for four of the hardest-hit CBSAs. In Las Vegas, for
instance, prices fell nearly 60 percent, and the REO share was as high as 75 percent.
To provide a more systematic analysis of the heterogeneity of the bust across cities and to
motivate, calibrate, and test the model, we use a proprietary data set provided by CoreLogic
supplemented by data from the United States Census. CoreLogic provides monthly data
for 2000 to 2013 for the nation as a whole and 99 of the 100 largest CBSAs. The data
set includes a repeat sales house price index, a house price index for non-distressed sales
only, sales counts for REOs and non-distressed sales, and estimates of quantiles of the LTV
distribution. We seasonally adjust the CoreLogic data and smooth the sales count series
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Figure 3: Price Boom vs. Price Bust Across Cities
Note: Scatter plot of seasonally adjusted data from CoreLogic along with quadratic regression line that
excludes CBSAs in greater Detroit which busted without a boom. The data are described in the appendix.
Each data point is an CBSA and is color coded to indicate in which quartile the CBSA falls when CBSAs
are sorted by the share of homes with over 80 percent LTV in 2006. Although the highest LTV CBSAs had
almost no boom and no bust (e.g. Indianapolis), the CBSAs below the best fit line tend to be CBSAs with
a large share of homeowners with high LTVs in 2006 (third quartile).
using a moving average. A complete description of the data and summary statistics are in
the appendix.
The best predictor of the size of the bust is the size of the preceding boom. Figure 3
plots the change in log price from 2003 to 2006 against the change in log price from each
market’s peak to its trough. There is a strong downward relationship, which motivates a
key feature of our model: The shock that causes the bust is a fall in home valuations that is
assumed to be proportional to the size of the preceding boom.
Figure 3 also reveals a more subtle fact: Metropolitan areas that had a larger boom had
a more-than-proportional larger bust. While a linear relationship between log boom size and
log bust size has an r-squared of 0.62, adding a quadratic term that allows for larger busts
in places with larger booms increases the r-squared to 0.68. The curvature can be seen in
the best-fit line in Figure 3.3 We argue that by exacerbating the downturn in the hardest-hit
3For the best fit line, the regressions that follow, and the model calibration, we exclude two outlier CBSAs
in southeast Michigan which had a large bust without a preceding boom so that the non-linearity is not
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areas, foreclosures explain why places with larger booms had disproportionately larger busts.
This explanation has an important corollary: Because default is predominantly caused
by negative equity, a larger bust should occur not only in places with a larger initial negative
shock to prices, but particularly in locations with a combination of a large shock and a
large fraction of houses with high LTVs — and thus close to default — prior to the bust.
To provide suggestive evidence that this prediction is borne out in the data, the points in
Figure 3 have different shapes for each quartile of the share of homeowners in the CBSA
with over 80 percent LTV in 2006. While the largest high LTV shares occurred in places
that did not have a bust — home values were not inflated in 2006, so the denominator of
LTV was lowest in these locations — one can see that the majority of CBSAs substantially
below the quadratic trend line were in the upper end of the high LTV share distribution
(triangles in the figure).
To formally investigate whether the interaction of many households with high LTVs and
a large preceding boom is correlated with a deep downturn, we estimate:
Yi = β0 + β1∆03−06 log (Pi) + β2 [∆03−06 log (Pi)]
2 (1)
+β3Xi + β4 (∆03−06 log (Pi)×Xi) + εi,
where i indexes CBSAs, Xi is an interacted variable, and the outcome variable Yi is either
the maximum change in log price, the maximum peak-to-trough change in log non-distressed
prices, the maximum peak-to-trough REO share, or the fraction of houses that experience
a foreclosure. We use two Xis. First, to test whether the combination of a large bust and
a large fraction of houses with high LTV creates a particularly large downturn, we use the
z score of the share of mortgages with over 80 percent LTV in 2006. This regression is
similar in spirit to Lamont and Stein (1999), who show that prices are more sensitive to
income shocks in cities with a larger share of high-LTV households. Second, to more directly
test the role of foreclosures, for price and non-distressed price we use the ex-post fraction
of houses that experience a foreclosure. The regression results are shown in Table 1, with
summary statistics and robustness checks in the appendix. With the share of mortgages
with a high LTV in 2006 as the interacted variable, the fourth row of the first four columns
shows the key result: The interaction term between the size of the run-up and the share
of high-LTV homeowners is significantly negative for price, non-distressed price, and sales
volume and significantly positive for the mean REO share of volume and the fraction of the
housing stock that is foreclosed upon. This is consistent with a combination of a steep price
run-up and high LTV homeowners triggering a price-default spiral.
overstated. All results are robust to including these two CBSAs.
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Columns 5 and 6 show both a negative direct effect of foreclosures and a negative effect
of the interaction between foreclosures and the size of the run up. While the interaction
term is insignificant for the overall price index due to a large standard error, the effect is
statistically significant for non-distressed prices. A negative direct effect and interaction is
expected for the aggregate price index since foreclosures trade at a discount, but the negative
effect on non-distressed prices provides evidence that foreclosures amplify the bust. Finally,
adding the interaction with fraction foreclosed to the regression eliminates the strong and
negative quadratic term on price, which suggests that the non-linearity in the size of the
bust relative to the size of the boom can be accounted for by foreclosures, as will be the case
in our model.
2 Model
We construct a a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides undirected equilibrium search model of
the housing market to quantitatively analyze the effects of foreclosures and policies aimed at
ameliorating their effects. Search frictions play an important role in housing markets: Houses
are illiquid, most households own one house and move infrequently, buyers and sellers are
largely atomistic, and search is costly, time consuming, and random.
We first describe the environment, agents, and shocks that agents receive. We then
describe the housing and mortgage markets and define equilibrium.
2.1 Environment, Agents, and Shocks
Time is discrete and indexed by a t subscript, and the discount factor is β. All agents
have linear utility. There are a unit mass of individuals who are assumed to be natural
homeowners and a unit mass of houses which can either be owned and rented.4 The model
is thus a closed system with a fixed population and housing stock.5
Individuals can be in one of four states. A mass lt of individuals are homeowners, v
b
t are
buyers who are searching for a home and renting while they do so, vrt are renters who do not
have a foreclosure on their record but have not qualified for a mortgage and are waiting to
search until they do so, and vft are renting and have a foreclosure on their record. The stock
4We focus on natural homeowners, but natural renters and transitions in and out of homeownership can
be added without substantially changing the model.
5For tractability and to focus the paper, we abstract away from housing supply. In practice, there was
little residential construction during the crisis. However, this assumption implies we may miss some features
of the crisis, such as depreciation of the existing housing stock or foreclosed homes being demolished. It also
means that we will not capture regional heterogeneity in housing supply elasticities when we perform our
cross-city analysis.
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of houses can have one of three statuses. lt are owner-occupied, v
v
t are non-owner-occupied
and not owned by a lender, and vdt are owned by lenders after a foreclosure. Of the v
v
t non-
owner-occupied houses that are not owned by a lender, vat are converted to rent temporarily,
which precludes them from being listed for sale, and vnt are listed for sale. As we describe
below, lenders have higher holding costs, and they consequently list all of the homes they
own for sale.
Homeowners experience two different shocks. First, they experience moving shocks with
probability γ that represent changes in tastes and life events that induce them to leave their
house as in Krainer (2001) and Ngai and Tenreyro (2014). We assume that these shocks occur
at a constant rate and that only individuals who are mismatched with their house attempt
to find a new one. When a moving shock occurs, what happens depends on the homeowner’s
equity position. If a homeowner has negative equity, which we will define momentarily, she
cannot pay off her mortgage balance with the proceeds from a sale, and consequently the
homeowner is “locked in” to the current house. We assume the homeowner takes actions
to accommodate the mismatch shock given her inability to move and remains a homeowner
until she receives another shock.6 If a homeowner has positive equity, she sells her house,
pays off the lender, and attempts to buy another house.
To define a homeowner’s equity position, we assume that there exists a competitive fringe
of market-markets who pay homeowners a price V˜ nt for the house and then market the home
to buyers through a search and matching process described subsequently, similar to Hedlund
(2016a).7 Homeowners thus have negative equity and are locked in if their loan balance
L > V˜ nt and have positive equity and sell if L ≤ V˜ nt . When positive equity homeowners
sell their house, they pay off their mortgage and attempt to secure pre-approval for new
financing.8 Pre-approval occurs with equilibrium probability Pt. If the individual receives a
pre-approval, she enters the housing market as a buyer. If the individual is unable to secure
pre-approval, she becomes a renter and attempts to secure pre-approval again at exogenous
rate γr. Pre-approval specifies Φ = (L, µ), the loan amount and the interest rate at which
financing can be secured at the time of purchase. We describe the endogenous pre-approval
probability Pt and loan terms Φ when we introduce the mortgage market below.
6For parsimony we do not fully model the income and savings of households. Rather, we make the reduced
form assumption that underwater homeowners experience lock-in. In practice, homeowners who are only
slightly underwater may have sufficient savings to make up the difference.
7As an alternative, one can imagine that when a homeowner enters the market, they turn into both a
seller and a buyer that are independent of one another as in Ngai and Tenreryo (2014). V˜ nt would then
reflect the value of having a listing on the market, inclusive of marketing and maintenance costs.
8Our modeling of pre-approvals implicitly assumes that households require financing to purchase a home.
In practice, few households purchase without a mortgage. Incorporating heterogeneous down payments
would significantly increase model complexity while adding little economic insight.
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The second type of shock a homeowner may receive is a liquidity shock, which occurs with
time-varying probability ιt. Again, what happens when a homeowner experiences a liquidity
shock depends on her equity position. Homeowners with negative equity who experience
a liquidity shock default because they are unable to afford their mortgage payments and
the price they could receive from a market-maker is insufficient to pay off their mortgage.
This “double trigger” default is the only source of default in our model. While “ruthless” or
“strategic default” by borrowers – that is default by a homeowner with the liquidity to pay
their mortgage – has occurred, there is a consensus in the literature that strategic default
accounts for a very small fraction of mortgage defaults.9 To keep the model tractable and
maintain a focus on housing market dynamics, we thus do not model strategic default, nor
do we model the strategic decision of the lender to foreclose, modify the loan, rent to the
foreclosed-upon homeowner, or pursue a short sale, which are options that were not widely
used until late in the crisis. Consequently, we assume that homeowners with L > V˜ nt default
if they experience a liquidity shock and enter the foreclosure process.
Homeowners who receive a liquidity shock who are above water, on the other hand, do not
default. In our baseline model, we further assume that they can remain in their house despite
the liquidity shock. In practice, homeowners with positive equity who receive a liquidity
shock have various means to avoid having to sell. For example, borrowers with positive home
equity could potentially borrow against it to cover temporary lost income. Homeowners with
positive equity could also pursue a refinancing or a term extension. For parsimony, we do
not fully model these options and instead make the reduced-form assumption that liquidity
shocks do not force sales for households with positive equity. In the appendix, we consider
an alternate model in which we assume that above-water homeowners who receive liquidity
shocks are forced to sell as a robustness test. This model features the same economic forces as
our baseline model and does reasonably well quantitatively. However, too many households
are forced to rent during the crisis relative to the data, which is why we prefer our baseline
assumption.
We further assume that foreclosure occurs immediately in our baseline model. In practice,
foreclosure is not immediate, and some loans in the foreclosure process do cure before they
are foreclosed upon. As another robustness check, in the appendix we consider a model in
which there is a delay before foreclosure completion and find similar results. We also study
the effects of slowing down foreclosure completions when we analyze policy in Section 6.
Homeowners who experience a foreclosure are prevented from buying for a period of time
and must rent in the interim. Foreclosure dramatically reduces a borrower’s credit score, and
many lenders, the GSEs, and the FHA require buyers to wait several years after a foreclosure
9See references in footnote 2.
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before they are eligible for a mortgage. Molloy and Shan (2013) use credit report data to
show that households that experience a foreclosure start are 55-65 percentage points less
likely to have a mortgage two years after a foreclosure start. Consequently, we assume that
each period, individuals who defaulted become eligible to apply for a new mortgage with
probability σ.
When a homeowner with positive equity sells, a market-maker takes possession of the
home. As in Head (2014), each period market-makers have the option of listing a house
for sale, which incurs a flow cost of mn, or renting the house for rt. When a homeowner
with negative equity defaults and is foreclosed upon, the lender takes possession of the
house and lists the house for sale, incurring a flow cost of md.10 Lenders do not rent out
distressed properties.11 We anticipate md < mn < 0, since vacant, distressed properties tend
to depreciate faster and thus require higher ongoing costs to maintain.12 This will manifest
itself in equilibrium as distressed homes selling at lower prices than other listed homes.
Buyers who have been pre-approved, renters, and households with a foreclosure on their
record all rent at the equilibrium rent rt. We assume that a given unit of housing provides
rental services for ζ renter households, with ζ < 1 so that renters occupy less square footage
than owner-occupants as in the data. The rental market is competitive and the supply con-
sists of those owner-occupied homes being rented out plus a permanent stock of rental homes
of mass vrs. The endogenous conversion of owner-occupied homes to rentals to accommodate
increased rental demand during the crisis is important in the bust.
2.2 Housing Market
Buyers and sellers in the housing market are matched randomly each period according to a
standard fixed-search-intensity constant-returns-to-scale matching function. Defining market
tightness θt as to the ratio of buyers to listed homes v
b
t/v
s
t where v
s
t = v
n
t +v
d
t , the probability
a seller meets a buyer qst , and the probability a buyer meets a seller q
b
t can be written as
10Alternatively, we could assume that lenders also sell to market-makers and that the costs to market-
makers of selling foreclosures are higher than the costs of selling non-distressed properties. Lenders would
then receive a price V dt for the property.
11We abstract away from the purchase of distressed home by institutional investors. In practice, these
investors did not enter until late in the crisis (around 2012) and then only in a few markets, such as Atlanta,
Tampa, and Phoenix. In our policy section we consider the impact of a government facility which purchases
distressed homes and then re-introduces them into the housing market once demand rebounds, which is
similar to the role played by investors.
12Lenders must make payments to security holders until a foreclosure liquidates, and they must also
assume the costs of pursuing the foreclosure, securing, renovating, and maintaining the house, and selling
the property. Even though they are paid additional fees to compensate for the costs of foreclosure and are
repaid when the foreclosed property sells, the lender’s effective return is far lower than its opportunity cost
of capital.
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functions of θt. Buyers meet each type of seller in proportion to their share of listed homes
in the market.
When matched, the buyer draws a valuation for the house h from a distribution Ft (h)
which is time-varying. This valuation is a one-time utility benefit consumed at purchase and
is common knowledge to both the buyer and seller. Prices are determined by generalized
Nash bargaining with weight ψ for the seller. If the buyer and seller decide to transact,
the seller leaves the market and the buyer obtains financing at the pre-approved terms and
becomes a homeowner. If not, the buyer and seller each return to the market to be matched
next period. The value of being a homeowner can be written as:
V ht (h,Φ) = h+ Γt (Φ) , (2)
where Γt (Φ) is a continuation value function that is a function of today’s loan terms Φ .
This value function takes into account the possibility of moving, lock-in, and default. It is
the only place where the value of being a renter both with and without a foreclosure on one’s
credit record enter. We relegate the formal definition of Γt and the value functions which
are necessary to define it to the appendix.
Denote the total match surplus when a buyer pre-approved to receive a loan with terms
Φ meets a seller of type j ∈ {n, d} and draws a match quality h at time t by SS,jt (h,Φ), the
buyer’s surplus by SB,jt (h,Φ), and the seller’s by S
S,j
t (h,Φ), with S
j
t (h,Φ) = S
B,j
t (h,Φ) +
SS,jt (h,Φ). Let the price of the house if it is sold be p
j
t (h,Φ). The buyer’s surplus is equal to
the value of being in the house minus the down payment and the outside option of staying
in the market:
SB,jt (h,Φ) = V
h
t (h,Φ)−
(
pjt (h,Φ)− L
)− βEtBt+1 (Φ) (3)
where B is the value function for being a buyer. The seller’s surplus is equal to the price
minus the outside option of staying in the market:
SS,jt (h,Φ) = p
j
t (h,Φ)− βEtV˜ jt+1, (4)
where V˜ jt is the value of having a vacant house that can be rented or put up for sale. Because
utility is linear and house valuations are purely idiosyncratic, a match results in a transaction
if h is above a zero-surplus threshold denoted by hjt (Φ):
V ht
(
hjt (Φ) ,Φ
)
= −L+ βEt
[
Bt+1 (Φ) + V˜
j
t+1
]
. (5)
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We can then define the remaining value functions. The value of listing a house for sale as
a market-marker n or as a lender d is equal to the flow payoff plus the discounted continuation
value plus the expected surplus of a transaction times the probability a transaction occurs.
Because sellers who list meet buyers with probability qs (θt) and transactions occur with
probability 1−Ft
(
hjt (Φ)
)
, the value of putting a house up for sale as a j = {n, d} type seller
is:
V jt = m
j + βEtV˜
j
t+1 + q
s (θt)
ˆ (
1− Ft
(
hjt (Φ)
))
Et
[
SS,jt (h,Φ) |h ≥ hjt (Φ)
]
dGpt (Φ) , (6)
where Gpt (Φ) is the distribution of pre-approval terms, and the integral is Lebesgue. The
value of a vacant home to a market maker V˜ nt reflects the option to either list or rent the
home, and in equilibrium market makers are indifferent so that:
V˜ nt = rt + βEtV˜
n
t+1 = V
n
t . (7)
This condition pins down rents. In equilibrium, competitive market makers make zero profits
in expectation, so V˜ nt is also the price they pay households selling their home. The value of
being a buyer is defined similarly to that of a seller:
Bt (Φ) = −rt+βEtBt+1 (Φ)+
∑
j=n,d
qb (θt)
vjt
vnt + v
d
t
(
1− Ft
(
hjt(Φ)
))
Et
[
SB,jt (h,Φ) |h ≥ hjt (Φ)
]
.
(8)
The buyer value function takes into account the possibility she can meet either normal or
REO sellers.
The conditional expectation of the total surplus given that a transaction occurs can be
simplified as in Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) by using (2) together with (3) and (4):
Sjt (h,Φ) = V
h
t (h,Φ)− V ht
(
hjt (Φ) ,Φ
)
= h− hjt (Φ) . (9)
This implies Et
[
Sjt |h ≥ hnt (Φ)
]
= Et [h− hnt (Φ) |h ≥ hnt (Φ)] .
Prices can be backed out by using Nash bargaining along with the definitions of the
surpluses (3) and (4) and (9) to obtain:
pjt (h,Φ) = ψ
(
h− hjt (Φ)
)
+ βEtV
j
t+1. (10)
This pricing equation is intuitive. The first term contains h − hjt (Φ), which is a sufficient
statistic for the surplus generated by the match as shown by Shimer and Werning (2007).
As the seller bargaining weight ψ increases, more of the total surplus is appropriated to the
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seller in the form of a higher price. The final two terms represent the seller’s outside option
of continuing as a seller next period. These terms form the minimum price at which a sale
can occur, so that all heterogeneity in prices comes from the distribution of h above the
cutoff hjt (Φ).
Define the joint distribution of current homeowner loan balances L and interest rates µ at
time t by Gt (L, µ) and the marginal distribution of loans as Gt (L). Given this specification
for the housing market and the environment defined in the previous section, the laws of
motion are:
lt+1 = (1− γ) ltGt
(
V˜ nt
)
+ (1− ιt) lt
(
1−G
(
V˜ nt
))
(11)
+vbtq
b
t (θt)
ˆ ∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
t
(
1− Ft
(
hjt (Φ)
))
dGpt (Φ)
vbt+1 =
[
γPtltGt
(
V˜ nt
)
+ γrPtv
r
t + σPtv
f
t
]
(12)
+vbt
[
1− qb (θt)
ˆ ∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
t
(
1− Ft
(
hjt(Φ)
))
dGpt (Φ)
]
vrt+1 = (1− γrPt) vrt + γ (1− Pt) ltGt
(
V˜ nt
)
+ σ (1− Pt) vft (13)
vvt+1 = γltG
(
V˜ nt
)
+ vnt
[
1−
ˆ
qs (θt) (1− Ft (hnt (Φ))) dGpt (Φ)
]
+ vat (14)
vdt+1 = ιtlt
(
1−G
(
V˜ nt
))
+ vdt
[
1−
ˆ
qs (θt)
(
1− Ft
(
hdt (Φ)
))
dGpt (Φ)
]
(15)
vft+1 = (1− σ)vft + ιtlt
(
1−G
(
V˜ nt
))
. (16)
Equation (11) says that the stock of homeowners lt increases due to buyers purchasing
homes and decreases due to above-water homeowners receiving taste shocks and below-
water homeowners receiving liquidity shocks. Equation (12) provides the law of motion
for the stock of buyers vbt . New potential buyers come from above-water homeowners who
receive a taste shock, individuals who previously defaulted losing their foreclosure flag, and
individuals who were previously denied pre-approval. Entering the market as a buyer is
conditional on receiving a pre-approval, which occurs with probability Pt. Equation (13)
gives the law of motion for the stock of renters who have been denied a pre-approval. These
renters re-apply for pre-approval at rate γr. Equation (14) gives the law of motion for houses
not currently owner-occupied, which we denote as vvt . Because a vacant home can either be
listed for sale or rented, the number of non-owner-occupied homes is equal to the number of
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sellers last period who did not sell plus the number of homes that were rented last period plus
the flow of above-water homeowners who experience a moving shock. Equation (15) says
that the mass of distressed sellers is equal to the inflow of foreclosures plus those distressed
sellers who did not sell last period. Finally, equation (16) gives the law of motion for the
stock of renters vft locked out of mortgage market due to a foreclosure flag on their credit
report. Equilibrium in the rental market requires:
vat + v
rs = ζ
[
vbt + v
f
t + v
r
t
]
, (17)
where vrs is the stock of dedicated rental housing. We provide the laws of motion for Gt (L, µ)
and Gpt (Φ) in the appendix.
2.3 Mortgage Market
All homeowners purchase their house with a mortgage. Mortgages in our economy can
be represented by (L, µ), a tuple that includes the loan balance L and interest rate µ.
Mortgagees pay down a constant fraction of the house’s principal γL plus interest each
period as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015). The required payment is thus (γL + µ)L
and the principal evolves according to Lt+1 = (1− γL)Lt. To keep the model tractable, we
assume that pre-payment can only occur in the event of a sale, so there is no endogenous
refinancing.
Households obtain mortgages from a continuum of competitive, risk neutral lenders. We
assume all lenders are identical and none go bankrupt unless the whole system becomes
insolvent, so the balance sheet of the financial system can be represented by a representative
lender. For tractability, we assume that at any point in time t, there is a single mortgage
contract offered to borrowers. To do so, we assume that there is an institutional constraint
that all mortgages are pre-approved at a fixed loan-to-value ratio φ relative to the average
non-distressed price in the market at time t, p¯nt .
The asset side of the representative lender’s balance sheet is comprised of pre-approvals
and originated mortgages. The book value Ωt of these assets is equal to:
Ωt = lt
ˆ
LdGt (L) + v
b
t
ˆ
LdGpt (L) , (18)
where Gt (L) is the marginal distribution of outstanding loan balances on originated mort-
gages and Gpt (L) is the marginal distribution of pre-approved loan balances. We assume
that the lender raises the financing for the loan at the time of pre-approval and holds the
proceeds in short-term marketable securities earning the risk-free rate µf until the loan is
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funded.
The representative lender funds itself by issuing short-term debt that is insured and thus
risk-free from the perspective of its creditors. The lender is, however, subject to a regulatory
capital requirement that mandates that its book equity Et be greater than or equal to a
certain percentage χ of its assets at all times:
Et ≥ χΩt. (19)
The financial system can be in two states of the world. In the first, lenders can costlessly
raise equity so that the capital constraint is satisfied. This is the default state that holds in
steady state, and in this state Pt = 1 because the lender can serve all customers by raising
equity. In the second, there is a breakdown in the equity issuance market, the ability to raise
new private capital is limited, and the law of motion for lender equity is:
Et+1 = Et + (1− ψ)ιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V dt − Lt
)
dG (Lt) + ∆
R
t , (20)
where G (Lit) is the distribution of loan balances at the beginning of period t. The second
term represents equity losses due to default, equal to a fraction 1 − ψ of total book losses,
with ψ reflecting the impact of government bailouts and (limited) private equity issuance.13
The outstanding mortgage balance is Lt, but the lender only receives V
d
t from selling a
foreclosure. The final term, ∆Rt , reflects increases in lender equity due to retained earnings.
The expression for retained earnings ∆Rt is provided in the appendix.
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The combination of capital requirements and the limited ability to issue new equity
implies that lenders may be prevented from issuing enough debt to cover the full demand
for new mortgage pre-approvals. In this case, for (19) to hold, Ωt must fall, which occurs
through Pt falling below one. The resulting equilibrium rationing occurs on quantity rather
than price, and rationing is random. The interest rate is always set such that lenders break
even in expectation. As a microfoundation, one can imagine that when households apply
for financing at time t, there is random sorting into a queue. Only the first Pt fraction of
13This specification is natural, as internal and regulatory pressures to recapitalize are likely higher during
periods of significant losses. This specification also puts government bailouts and private capital injections
during the crisis on an equal footing, which makes economic sense and is useful when we consider policy.
In Appendix D.2.4, we consider an alternative law of motion for lender equity where the private capital
injection is additive rather than part of ψ. All of the economic insights of the paper continue to hold under
this alternate law of motion for lender equity, although the model fit is worse than under our preferred
specification.
14We assume that the lenders believe that the probability of a breakdown in the equity issuance is suffi-
ciently small and the benefits of debt are sufficiently large such that lenders pay out all retained earning to
their shareholders and that the capital requirement binds when equity can be freely issued.
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applicants in the line can be serviced. Lenders and households bargain over the financing
terms, with the Nash bargaining weight of the household equal to 1. This implies break-even
pricing even in the rationing equilibrium.
Our mortgage and banking system is similar to approaches taken by a number of recent
papers that study the interaction of housing markets and the banking sector. Elenev et
al. (2016) and Greenwald et al. (2018) also include capital constrained lenders in a model
with default, but they focus on bank failure in a model with heterogeneous lenders and tailor
their model to study restructuring the GSEs and shared-appreciation mortgages, respectively.
Hedlund (2016a, 2016b) and Hedlund and Garriga (2019) also include a mortgage sector in a
search model of the housing market. However, their directed search model shuts down some
of the main effects we highlight in our undirected search model, and their lending sector is
competitive and not subject to a capital constraint. Finally, Paixao (2017) finds results of a
similar magnitude in a model focused on household consumption.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given this setup we can define an equilibrium:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is defined by: masses lt, v
b
t , v
n
t , v
d
t , v
v
t , v
a
t , v
r
t , v
f
t , value
functions V dt , V
n
t , V˜
n
t , Vt (h,Φ) , Γt (Φ), and Bt (Φ), purchase cutoffs h
n
t (Φ) and h
d
t (Φ), rents
rt and house prices p
j
t (h,Φ), a competitive interest rate µt, a book value of the representative
lender’s assets Ωt, Equity Et, a pre-approval probability Pt, and distributions Gt (Φ) and
Gpt (Φ) such that:
1. The laws of motion and adding up constraints (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
and the adding-up constraint vvt = v
n
t + v
a
t are satisfied and the distributions Gt (Φ)
and Gpt (Φ), evolve according to the laws of motion in the appendix.
2. The value functions (2), (6) for j = {n, d}, (8), V˜ nt = V nt , and the equation for Γt (Φ)
in the appendix are satisfied.
3. The purchase cutoffs satisfy (5) for j = {n, d}.
4. Rents satisfy (7).
5. House prices satisfy (10).
6. The book value of the representative lender’s assets satisfies (18). Equity satisfies (19)
and, if equity issuance is limited, satisfies (20).
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7. The pre-approval probability Pt = 1 if equity can be raised and Pt ∈ [0, 1] satisfies (19)
if equity issuance is limited.
8. Lenders break even in expectation given the interest rate.
3 Calibration
We solve our model numerically. After choosing several functional forms, we take a four-
step approach to calibrating the parameters of the model. First, we externally calibrate
several parameters that correspond directly to parameters commonly used in the literature
or which are directly observable in the data. Second, we select several parameters to match
the model’s steady state without default to pre-downturn empirical moments. Third, we
calibrate parameters specific to the downturn to match the model’s simulated nationwide
downturn to moments from the recent housing crisis. Finally, we evaluate our calibrated
model’s ability to match cross-sectional heterogeneity in the severity of the downturn across
different cities.
3.1 Parameterization of Functional Forms
We calibrate the model so that one period is a week. We use a constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas matching function so that with vbt buyers and v
s
t sellers there areΞ
(
vbt
)ξ
(vst )
1−ξ
matches. The probability a seller meets a buyer is thus qs (θt) = Ξθ
ξ
t , and the probability
a buyer meets a seller is qb (θt) = Ξθ
ξ−1
t . The elasticity of the matching function is set to
ξ = 0.84 based on Genesove and Han (2012).15
We parameterize the distribution of idiosyncratic valuations F (·) as an exponential dis-
tribution with parameter λ shifted by a¯t, which represents the aggregate valuation of homes.
Using an exponential is a neutral assumption because the memoryless property implies that
Et
[
h− hjt (Φ) |h ≥ hjt (Φ)
]
= 1
λ
for all Φ, which eliminates the effects of difficult-to-measure
properties of the tail thickness of the distribution on the conditional expectation of the sur-
plus. This assumption implies all movements in average prices p¯jt = ψ/λ + βEtV
j
t+1 work
through V jt .
15Ξ is normalized to 0.5 so that the probability of matching falls on [0, 1], and the results are not sensitive
to this normalization.
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3.2 Externally-Calibrated Parameters
We set the annual household discount rate to five percent. Lenders and households discount
at the same exogenous rate, so the riskless lender cost of capital is µf = 1/β − 1. The
probability of a moving shock is set to match a median tenure for owner occupants of
approximately nine years from the American Housing Survey (AHS) from 1997 to 2005. We
also use the AHS to set the fraction of an owner-occupied house’s floor space occupied by a
renter, ζ, to be 0.65. This reflects a conservative estimate of the average fraction of square
footage per person and lot size occupied by renters who moved in the past year relative to
owner occupants, as detailed in the appendix.
We set the non-distressed seller flow cost to reflect an annual maintenance cost of 3%.
The Nash bargaining weight ψ is set to satisfy the Hosios condition.
We set the probability that a foreclosed-upon homeowner returns to being able to be pre-
approved for a loan σ so that the average foreclosed-upon homeowner is out of the market
for two-and-a-half years. Most lenders require one to seven years to pass after a foreclosure
to be eligible for another mortgage. For instance, Veterans Administration loans require
two years, Federal Housing Administration loans three years, and Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac required five years prior to 2011 and now require seven years, although reductions are
allowed based on circumstances. We choose two-and-a-half years to fall in the middle of the
range of waiting periods and alter this parameter in robustness checks.
The geometric rate of principal pay down is based on a thirty-year amortization. The
LTV requirement is set to φ = 0.80 to reflect the conforming loan limit, and our results are
not sensitive to increasing this to φ = 0.90. γr is set so that a household that is denied
prepayment waits an average of eight weeks to seek another pre-approval. We set the capital
requirement χ equal to 10% based on evidence from Begenau (2019).16 Capital injections
during the crisis ψ = ψG + ψE reflect government bailouts ψG and limited private equity
infusions. We set ψG = 0.25. based on evidence from Begenau et al. (2019) and let the data
pin down ψE.
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3.3 Calibration to Steady-State Moments
We choose the initial housing preference parameter a¯0, the shape parameter for the exponen-
tial distribution of idiosyncratic valuations λ, the dedicated stock of rental housing vrs, and
16Begenau (2019) estimates a Tier 1 capital requirement of 9.3%, taking into account banks’ buffers over
the regulatory threshold.
17Begenau et al. (2019) report total charge-offs by bank holding companies of approximately $520 billion
during the crisis. The “Paulson Plan” injected $130 billion into these companies in the form of preferred
equity (Veronesi and Zingales (2010)). While these numbers do not reflect the entire scope of losses or
government interventions during the crisis, the implied bailout of 25% provides a reasonable baseline.
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Table 2: Target Steady-State Moments
Moment Target Source
Mean House Price $300k Adelino et al. (2012)
mean price for 10 MSAs
REO Discount 12.5% Clauretie and Deneshvary (2009),
Campbell et al. (2011)
Non-Distressed Time on Market 26.00 Weeks Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)
Buyer Time on Market 29.05 Weeks 1.117 times seller time from
Genesove and Han (2012)
the REO seller flow cost md to match four pre-crisis moments in the data to the steady-state
of the model, which we denote by dropping time subscripts. Because default was negligible
pre-crisis, we consider a steady state in which ι = 0, so defaults are measure zero. We also
assume that in the steady-state equity issuance is costless, which implies that P = 1. These
two assumptions simplify the steady state, as described in the appendix.
For these four parameters, we target the non-distressed seller time on the market, the
average buyer time on the market, the mean house price, and the average REO discount.
Intuitively, the mean price and seller time on the market are jointly determined by a¯0 and λ,
the buyer time on the market relative to sellers is determined by vrs, and the REO discount
is determined by md. The REO discount in steady state is calculated as the sale price of
an infinitesimal number of distressed sales in the housing market. The target values for the
moments are summarized in Table 2 and detailed in the appendix, and these moments are
matched exactly. Our resulting parameter values are listed in Table 3, with the parameters
set exogenously in the top panel and the parameters set through moment matching in the
bottom panel. Importantly, matching the REO discount implies md < mn < 0.18
3.4 Simulating a National Housing Crisis
We simulate a housing crisis which matches the features of the national US housing market
between 2006 and 2013. To do so, we start the model at its steady-state, with the exception
that the initial LTV distribution matches the national loan balance distribution in 2006 from
CoreLogic. We then compute the perfect foresight impulse response to a housing valuation
shock and a concurrent increase in liquidity shocks. Specifically, at the time of the crisis,
we hit the model with a permanent shock to home valuations, which we implement by
18Andersson and Mayock (2014) indicate that the total costs of foreclosing upon, maintaining, and selling
an REO in the Great Recession were 8.5% of the house’s value. In the model downturn when REO prices
plunge and time on the market rises, the average REO seller’s cumulative listing costs rise to 9% of the price.
The md we use is thus of reasonable magnitude.
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Table 3: Parameter Values Calibrated to Pre-Downturn Moments
Param Value Units Param Value Units
β 1− .05
52
Weekly Rate Ξ 0.5
γ 0.08
52
Weekly Rate ξ 0.84
γL 1/(30× 52) Weekly Rate ζ 0.65
γr 1/8 Weekly Rate ψ 0.16
σ 1/(2.5× 52) Weekly Rate mn −0.144 Thousands of $
χ 0.10 ψG 0.25
a¯ 609.67 Thousands of $ md −0.483 Thousands of $
λ 0.015 Thousands of $ vrs 0.023 Mass ( Housing stock = 1)
reducing the minimum idiosyncratic valuation a¯0 to a¯t = a
fraca¯0. We use a permanent
shock since it reflects a bursting bubble and is consistent with the empirical facts in Section
1. We further assume that at the time of the crisis, there is an increase in the rate of
liquidity shocks ιt, which will create default among underwater homeowners. We assume
ιt = CιUnempt, where Cι is a constant and Unempt is a moving average of the time path of
long-run unemployment in the Great Recession as detailed in the appendix. This assumption
reflects the fact that large liquidity shocks come from persistent income shocks proxied by
long-run unemployment. Finally, we assume that during the crisis lenders are limited in their
ability to raise new equity capital for TE periods. This reflects the temporary breakdown in
financial markets that occurred in the Great Recession and creates a role for lender balance
sheets in the crisis.
We choose four parameters that affect the downturn but not the steady state of the model
to match four empirical moments of the national housing downturn. These parameters are
the constant scaling the liquidity shocks Cι, the size of the decline in housing valuations
afrac, the fraction of losses covered by raising private capital during the crisis ψE, and the
date TE that equity markets fully re-open. We target four moments: The peak-to-trough
decline in the housing price index, the peak-to-trough decline in non-distressed transaction
volume, the average REO share between 2006 and 2013, and the total number of foreclosures
between 2006 and 2013.19
To solve the model, we discretize the possible mortgage balances using an equally spaced
grid with 51 grid points. Further numerical details as well as the full system of equations that
result from this discretization are provided in the appendix. We do a good job matching the
target moments, with no moment more than 0.2 percent from its target value. The resulting
parameter values of the calibration are reported in Table 4. The 24.75 percent fall in a¯
19The moments are jointly determined, but each moment is principally controlled by a single parameter.
Cι determines the total number of foreclosures, TE the average REO share given the number of foreclosures,
afrac the price decline, and ψE the volume decline.
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Table 4: Parameter Values Calibrated to Downturn Moments
Param Value
afrac 0.7525
TE 194 Weeks
ψE .390
Cι 0.328
implies that prices fall permanently by 11.91 percent nationally due to the valuation shock.
3.5 Simulating the Cross-Section of Downturns
To further evaluate the performance of our model, we consider its ability to match cross-
sectional variation in the severity of the crisis across metropolitan areas. To do so, we
simulate a separate housing downturn in each CBSA in our CoreLogic data. We assume
that each CBSA is a closed system, with a housing market described by Sections 2.1 and
2.2.20 We furthermore assume that there is a national representative lender. This is a good
approximation to the fact that most loans are made by lenders with wide geographic coverage
and most loans that are securitized are pooled geographically.21 This implies that the path
for Pt is the same for each CBSA and is calculated from the national downturn.
We allow for cities to differ in the size of the permanent price drop, the magnitude of
liquidity shocks, and the initial loan balance distribution. We focus on these three dimensions
of heterogeneity because the size of the preceding price run-up is the single best predictor of
the size of the ensuing downturn as described in Section 1, because cities varied dramatically
in their unemployment rate in the Great Recession, and because the loan balance distribution
is critical to the strength of the price-foreclosure feedback in our model. The empirical loan
balance distribution comes from proprietary estimates by CoreLogic, who report quantiles of
the combined loan-to-value distribution for active mortgages in 2006 computed from public
records and CoreLogic’s valuation models.22 We allocate mass to finer loan balance bins
in the model within each quantile equally as described in the appendix. We incorporate
heterogeneity in the magnitude of liquidity shocks by letting the path of liquidity shocks in
city c be ιct = CιUnempt
maxUnempc
maxUnemp
, where Cι is from the national calibration, Unempt is
the national long-run unemployment time series, and maxUnemp
c
maxUnemp
is the ratio of the maximum
20This assumption of a closed system implies that we neglect migration between CBSAs. Modeling mi-
gration between CBSAs would greatly complicate the analysis and add little in terms of insights.
21While one could try to model several lenders with different market shares in different cities, this would
introduce tremendous complexity into the model without substantial added value.
22Because our model concerns the entire owner-occupied housing stock and not just houses with an active
mortgage, we supplement the CoreLogic data with the Census’ estimates of the fraction of owner-occupied
houses with a mortgage from the 2005-2007 American Community Surveys.
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long-run unemployment rate in city c to the national long-run unemployment rate.23 The
permanent shock to home valuations afrac is chosen to generate a price decline proportional
to the log price gain from 2003 to 2006:
∆ log ppermanent = −η1 (∆ log p2003−2006 − η0) . (21)
η0 is an intercept term chosen so that ∆ log ppermanent matches the a
frac in the national
calibration and η1 is a slope term.
24 The limited amount of heterogeneity between cities
creates a stringent test for the ability of our model to match the cross-sectional empirical
patters of the housing crisis.
η1 is chosen to minimize the sum of squared differences between the model and the data
for the peak-to-trough log aggregate price decline for each metropolitan area. We start each
CBSA in the initial steady state and calculate the perfect foresight impulse response given
the initial loan balance distribution, the time path of the national lender’s pre-approval
probability Pt, the city-specific time path of liquidity shocks ι
c
t , and the city-specific a
frac
calculated to satisfy (21). This yields a unique optimum of η0 = 0.113 and η1 = 0.456. This
implies that if a city has a larger boom than the national average, roughly half of that boom
relative to the national average is permanently lost when the bust hits. We return to the
cross-sectional calibration in Section 5.
4 Decomposing the Effects of Foreclosures
4.1 Downturn Dynamics
Figure 4 illustrates the model dynamics for the national downturn. As shown in panel A,
at the time of the shock, prices fall considerably for both REO and non-distressed sales and
gradually return to steady state as the liquidity shocks dissipate. The aggregate price index
dips more than the non-distressed price index since REO sales trade at a discount. This
discount widens in the crisis, consistent with evidence from Campbell et al. (2011). Panel B
shows that sales fall on the impact of the shock and continue to fall substantially as REOs
become prevalent in the market. Panel C shows the decline in market tightness over the
crisis, and Panel D shows the dynamics of foreclosures. The largest difference between the
model and the data is that the model does not feature price momentum (Guren, 2018), so
23We take this approach this rather than using the time series of UnempC directly because the BLS does
not produce city-level long-run unemployment time series that are reliable at a high frequency.
24A handful of cities with small booms from 2003 to 2006 have a small permanent increase in their long-
term price level under this formulation. Our results are not sensitive to capping ∆ log ppermanent at zero for
these cities.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of National Downturn
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Note: This figure shows the results of the calibrated national model . Panels A and B show the average price
and sales by type, with pre-downturn price and volume normalized to 1. Panel C shows market tightness.
Panel D shows the annualized fraction of the owner occupied housing stock that is foreclosed upon at each
point in time.
prices fall immediately on the impact of the shocks rather than gradually.
4.2 Forces Affecting Prices and Sales in a Downturn
There are three main forces through which default affects the non-distressed market in our
model: a lender rationing effect, a foreclosure flag effect, and a choosey buyer effect. In this
subsection, we describe the intuition and qualitative impact of each effect before quantifying
their respective contributions.
First, there is a foreclosure flag effect. When a homeowner defaults, the lender sells the
property as an REO, but the homeowner has a foreclosure flag on her credit record and is
locked out of the housing market for a time until the flag is cleared. The foreclosure process
thus creates listings immediately, but the corresponding demand only arrives with a delay.
Second, there is a lender rationing effect. Default leads to declines in lender equity.
Lenders ration mortgage credit because they are temporarily unable to raise equity and would
violate their capital constraint if they were to fully meet the demand for new mortgages by
issuing debt. Mortgage rationing causes some homeowners who sell their house to delay their
next purchase because they cannot secure financing. This too creates immediate listings,
26
but the corresponding buyers only arrive with a delay as the lenders gradually recapitalize
and households re-apply for financing.25
By creating an imbalance between the number of sellers and the number of buyers op-
erating in the housing market, both the foreclosure flag and lender rationing effects reduce
market tightness θt. The reduction in market tightness is partially offset by sellers who
convert their owner-occupied house to rental space, which is required to meet the increased
rental demand by foreclosed-upon households and households unable to secure financing.
The fall in market tightness decreases the probability a seller meets a buyer, which in turn
incentivizes sellers to transact faster, weakening their bargaining position and leading to
lower prices. This incentive to sell is stronger for REO sellers who have a higher opportunity
cost of not meeting a buyer, causing the REO discount to grow. Conversely, buyers are more
willing to walk away from a deal, strengthening their bargaining position, which also leads
to declines in price. Because the reduction in market tightness pushes down non-distressed
prices, it pushes more homeowners underwater and leads to increased default, which leads
to further rationing and foreclosure flag effects through a price-default spiral.
The third way that the non-distressed market is affected by default is a choosey buyer
effect. Since REO sales trade at a discount, the presence of distressed sales increase the
buyer’s outside option to transacting, which is resampling from the distribution of sellers
next period. This choosey buyer effect causes infra-marginal buyers to walk away from non-
REO listings. This reduces non-distressed transaction volume and causes buyers to negotiate
a lower price when they do transact. The choosey buyer effect is reinforced by the foreclosure
flag effect and lender rationing effect. Both push down market tightness which has a bigger
effect on the value functions of REO sellers and increases the REO discount. This in turn
sweetens the prospect of being matched with an REO seller next period, amplifying the
choosey buyer effect.
The choosey buyer effect is new to the literature and formalizes folk wisdom in housing
markets that foreclosures empower buyers and cause them to wait for a particularly favorable
transaction.26 We expect that choosey buyer effects arise in other frictional asset markets
25See Paixao (2019) for empirical evidence that house price declines affected credit supply through bank
balance sheets in the housing bust.
26For instance, The New York Times reported that “before the recession, people simply looked for a house
to buy...now they are on a quest for perfection at the perfect price,” with one real estate agent adding that
“this is the fallout from all the foreclosures: buyers think that anyone who is selling must be desperate. They
walk in with the bravado of, ‘The world’s coming to an end, and I want a perfect place’” (“Housing Market
Slows as Buyers Get Picky” June 16, 2010). The Wall Street Journal provides similar anecdotal evidence,
writing that price declines “have left many sellers unable or unwilling to lower their prices. Meanwhile,
buyers remain gun shy about agreeing to any purchase without getting a deep discount. That dynamic
has fueled buyers’ appetites for bank-owned foreclosures” (“Buyer’s Market? Stressed Sellers Say Not So
Fast” April 25, 2011). Albrecht et al. (2007) introduce motivated sellers into a search model, but focus
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Table 5: Decomposition of Effects in National Model
Statistic No Liquidity No Rationing, No Full
(Peak to Trough Unless Indicated) Shocks No Choosey Buyer Rationing Model
Price Index 40.57% 71.49% 72.88% 100%
Non-Distressed Price Index 51.96% 74.19% 77.40% 100%
Non-Distressed Sales Volume 22.71% 51.86% 56.43% 100%
Average REO Share 0% 61.52% 62.75% 100%
Total Foreclosures 0% 76.84% 77.76% 100%
Note: Each cell indicates the fraction of the full model accounted for each column’s model relative to the full
model. No rationing turns off the lender rationing effect by setting Pt = 1 . No rationing and no choosey
buyer additionally turns off the choosey buyer effect by altering the buyer’s value function so she does not
take into account the possibility of meeting an REO seller, which leaves only the foreclosure flag effect. No
default turns off all of the effects and entirely eliminates default.
with idiosyncratic valuations.
Finally, there are two other effects at work in our model that affect aggregates that are
averages of the distressed and non-distressed markets. First, there is a lock-in effect. In
the absence of liquidity shocks – and thus the absence of default – the permanent decline in
housing valuations places some households underwater. These households are then locked
into their current house until they pay down their mortgage enough to become above water.
This lock-in effect has a minimal impact on prices but does lower sales volume. Second,
there is a compositional effect. A greater share of REO sales makes the average sale look
more like an REO, which sells faster and at a lower price both in and out of steady state.
This affects sales-weighted averages such as total sales and the aggregate price index.
4.3 Quantitative Decomposition of Effects
To quantify the relative contributions of each force, we introduce them one by one. We first
simulate a housing crisis in which we shut down default completely by eliminating liquidity
shocks, so the only effects are the initial housing valuation shock and lock-in. We then
simulate a crisis where we shut down both the lender rationing effect by assuming lenders can
costlessly raise equity and the choosey buyer effect by assuming the buyer’s value function
does not take into account the possibility of meeting a REO seller. This leaves only the
foreclosure flag effect. We then reintroduce the choosey buyer effect but continue to shut
down the lender rationing effect.
on steady-state matching patterns (e.g. whether a high type buyer can match with a low type seller) and
asymmetric information regarding seller type. Duffie et al. (2007) consider a liquidity shock similar to our
foreclosure shock, but a transaction occurs whenever an illiquid owner meets a liquid buyer, so their model
does not have a choosey buyer effect.
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Table 5 shows the fraction of the decrease in various measures of prices, sales, and foreclo-
sures in the full nation-wide model accounted for by each model. Our preferred measure of
the extent to which foreclosures exacerbate housing downturns is the decline in non-distressed
prices because it does not include compositional effects and is a direct measure of foreclosure
spillovers. Table 5 reports that the model without any default account explains 51.96% of
the peak-to-trough decline in non-distressed prices. The foreclosure flag effect explains an
additional 22.23%, and the choosey buyer effect explains an additional 3.21%. The impact
of the choosey buyer effect is significantly larger in the hardest hit CBSAs where the REO
share was much higher. Finally, lender rationing explains the remaining 22.60%. Note that
lender rationing plays a particularly large role in explaining the decline in sales volume.
Indeed, to jointly match the substantial price and volume declines in the data, our model
requires a significant lender rationing channel. Overall, our quantitative results suggest that
accounting for default is crucial to understanding the dynamics of the housing bust.
These effects are substantially larger than the spillover effects of foreclosures estimated
by microeconometric studies that cannot account for the general equilibrium effects of fore-
closure at the search market level or the effects of foreclosures on lender balance sheets (e.g.
Campbell et al., 2011; Gerardi et al., 2015; Anenberg and Kung, 2014). An exception is
Mian et al. (2014), who find much larger effects using more macro variation arising from
differences in foreclosure policies at state lines, which is consistent with our finding of a
substantial search-market-level effect.
4.4 Robustness
In the appendix we present calibration robustness checks to show that our results are robust
to some of our assumed parameter values, in particular γr, σ, and ζ. There is some dispersion
in the strength of the various effects across calibrations, but generally the lender rationing
effect accounts for between 20 and 25 percent of the overall decline in non-distressed prices,
the choosey buyer effect accounts for approximately three percent, and the foreclosure flag
effect accounts for 20 to 25 percent of the decline. In all cases, there are important spillovers
from foreclosures to the non-distressed market, principally through the foreclosure flag and
lender rationing channels.
The appendix also reports results for four alternate models. First, we show that a model
without the lender rationing fails to account for the decline in sales in the data. Second,
we show that a model in which there is some foreclosure delay can still fit the data quite
well. Third, we show that a model in which positive-equity homeowners who experience
an liquidity shock are forced to sell does reasonably well matching the cross-section but
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Figure 5: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
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Note: Each panel shows scatter plots of data vs simulation results for 96 CBSAs in regression analysis. The
red X represents the national simulation and each black dot is a CBSA. The 45-degree line illustrates a
perfect match between the model and the data. The variable being plotted shown in each plot’s title. The
data are described in the appendix. The calibration methodology, which fits the cross-cities model only to
the aggregate price decline in panel A, is described in text. The price decline is the maximum peak-to-trough
change, while the fraction foreclosed which is the total from 2006 to 2013.
overstates the amount of conversion to rental relative to the data. Finally, we show that we
obtain similar results with an alternate parameterization for private equity injections.
5 Cross-City Quantitative Analysis
To provide further support for our structural model and calibration, we now assess whether
our model with a limited amount of heterogeneity can account for differences in the downturn
across cities. We then illustrate the importance of default and foreclosure in explaining the
downturn by showing that our model does a better job at matching the cross-sectional
moments described in Section 1 than a model without default.
5.1 Cross-Sectional Model Fit
Figure 5 plots our simulated results from the baseline model against actual data for 96 CBSAs
(black dots) and the national model (red X). Panel A shows the maximum log change in
aggregate prices, which is used in the calibration of η1. The model fits well, with the data
points clustering around the 45-degree line across the spectrum of price declines. Indeed,
when we regress the simulated data on the actual data we get a coefficient of 1.005, and we
cannot statistically reject a coefficient of one and an intercept of zero. Panel B shows the
fraction of the housing stock foreclosed upon over eight years. This is a moment used in the
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Table 6: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
Reg Coef of 1.005 1.389 0.8283 0.992 0.434
Data on Model (0.063)*** (0.087)*** (0.090)*** (0.069)*** (0.055)***
R2 0.736 0.734 0.482 0.695 0.419
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. The comparisons
show the slope term of a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
national calibration, so the national model is fits almost exactly, but it is not a target for
the cross-section. Nonetheless, when we regress the simulated data on the real data, we get
a coefficient of 0.992 and we cannot reject a coefficient of one and an intercept of zero. The
limited heterogeneity in our model thus does a good job capturing the variation in default
across cities.27
Table 6 summarizes the model fit for the national prices and foreclosures as well as three
other metrics: the decline in non-distressed prices, the mean REO share, and a proxy for
the share of the owner-occupied housing stock converted to rentals. For each outcome, we
report the coefficient and r-squared we obtain when we regress the simulated data on the
actual data. The coefficient is somewhat too high for non-distressed prices because the model
under-predicts the decline in non-distressed prices in the hardest hit CBSAs. However, the
non-distressed price index in these CBSAs indicates a declining foreclosure discount, which
is inconsistent with the literature and suggests that these indices are biased downward by
negative quality selection on the non-distressed houses that sell in the hardest-hit CSBAs.
The model does well with REO share, although the coefficient is a bit too low because the
model under-predicts the sales decline in the least-hit CBSAs. In the data, even cities with
no price decline exhibited a significant volume decline. The volume decline from the decrease
in national pre-approvals is not enough to fully match the volume decline in these cities.
The last column provides an additional out-of-sample test by comparing the maximum
share of owner-occupied homes converted to rental homes in the model to approximate
figures for 2006 to 2013 described in the appendix. This is important because if the model
dramatically under-predicts the number of conversions, the change in market tightness in the
bust will be too strong and the model will ascribe too much of the downturn to foreclosures.
27The appendix presents a calibration where we do not include heterogeneity in the liquidity shock series
by CBSA. The model qualitatively has fits many of the features described in this section but does not
quantitatively fit quite as well: if we regress the log change in the aggregate price index in the model on
the corresponding data, we get an r-squared of 0.667 rather than 0.736. The model fits better with the
unemployment heterogeneity because of a few hard-hit CBSAs like Las Vegas.
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Figure 6: Boom vs. Bust in Baseline and No Default Models
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B. Model With No Default
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Note: The left panel shows the size of the boom vs. the model simulated data for the baseline calibrated
model with default, while the right panel shows the same plot for the no default model. The black solid
line is a best quadratic fit. The red dashed line shows the best quadratic fit to the actual data. For the no
default model, η1 = 0.844.
The model predicts that at the peak level of conversion, 7.38 percent of the owner-occupied
housing stock is converted to rentals nationally relative to 4.35 percent in the data. Across
cities, there is a positive correlation between the model and the data despite a considerable
amount of noise due to the data we use for conversion being a crude proxy. The amount of
endogenous conversion in our model is thus of the right order of magnitude.
5.2 Comparison With No Default Model
We now ask how well our model can account for cross-sectional variation in the data relative
to a model with no default. To do so, we compare our model to a model with no liquidity
shocks and thus no default or foreclosures. We calibrate the model to match the national
price decline and optimally choose η1 using equation (21) as before to give the no-default
model the best possible opportunity to match the data.
Figure 6 replicates Figure 3 and plots the size of the bust against the size of the boom
using model simulations for the baseline and no default models rather than the raw data.
The solid black line shows the best quadratic fit to the model simulated data, while the red
dashed line shows the best quadratic fit to the actual data as in Figure 3.
The baseline model quantitatively captures the non-log-linearity in the size of the bust
relative to the size of the boom in the data: The solid black and dashed red lines are close to
each other and have similar curvature. Furthermore, moving from a linear fit to a quadratic
fit in the simulated data increases the r-squared from 0.78 to 0.85, relative to 0.62 to 0.68
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Table 7: Model vs. Data: Interaction of Size of Boom With High LTV Share
∆ log (P)× Z LTV > 80% ∆ log (P) ∆ log (P
nd
) Mean REO Share % Foreclosed
Baseline -0.396 -0.140 0.307 0.167
(.034)*** (0.013)*** (0.029)*** (.014)***
No Default -.102 -.102
(.004)*** (.004)***
Data -0.310 -0.336 0.205 0.235
(0.123)** (0.113)*** (0.075)*** (0.054)***
Notes: * = 10% Significance, ** = 5% Significance *** = 1% significance. All standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Each column shows estimates of (1) with the constant suppressed. Pnd is a non-distressed
only price index. The mean REO share of sales volume is the average from 2008 to 2012, and the fraction
foreclosed is the fraction of the housing stock foreclosed upon over the first 8 years of the downturn. All
data is from CoreLogic and described in the appendix.
in the actual data. By contrast, the model without default is nearly linear in the size of the
bust relative to the size of the boom and adding a quadratic term does little to improve the
fit, with the r-squared rising from 0.990 to only 0.994. This is because essentially all of the
price decline comes from the permanent decrease in prices that is proportional to the boom.
Consequently, the model fit for price is much better in both the hardest and least hardest
hit areas in the model with default relative to the model without default. A final measure
of fit is the mean squared error for the aggregate price index. Without default, the mean
squared error is 0.0166, while with default this falls to 0.0135.
To further explore the improvement in fit, Table 7 reports the interaction term from
regression (1) from Table 1 using simulated outcomes from the baseline and no default
models. The model does qualitatively well. The no default model has a negative interaction
for price due to lock in, but the coefficient is too small relative to the data. The baseline model
with default, by contrast, does a better job of matching the data, although the interaction
is a too strong for regular prices and too weak for non-distressed prices.
Overall, we conclude that including default is crucial for models to match cross-sectional
moments from the recent housing bust.
6 Foreclosure Policy
A number of foreclosure mitigation policies have been proposed to reduce the severity of a
housing crisis. In this section, we use our calibrated model to perform a quantitative study
of the positive effects of several different interventions, focusing on their effects on house
prices declines and foreclosure rates. We begin by evaluating the effects of interventions at
the local local level, that is in one city holding national credit conditions fixed and then
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move on to to evaluating the effects of national government policy interventions that allow
credit conditions to be endogenous.
Before examining the policies, there are some important limitations to our policy analysis
that the reader should keep in mind. First, since we do not fully model household consump-
tion and the household costs of default, we are unable to make quantitative statements about
welfare.28 Second, while we compute the dollar costs to the government of various types of
policy interventions, we do not model the means by which the government finances the ex-
penditure, which may involve distortionary taxation or borrowing that affects equilibrium
interest rates. Nonetheless, we are able to give clear intuitions on the positive effects of
various government interventions and make clear, quantitative statements about the cost-
effectiveness of various types of foreclosure policies in terms of mitigating a price-default
spiral.
6.1 Limiting Foreclosure Completions
We begin our policy analysis by considering the impact of slowing down the rate of foreclo-
sure completions, which was a policy intervention hotly debated during the housing crisis.
Proponents argued that this policy could be implemented quickly and at a low cost relative
to other government interventions. However, this policy also had its detractors. For exam-
ple, during the 2012 Presidential campaign, Mitt Romney proposed removing legal barriers
to foreclosure completion to get the economic damage over with rather than slowing them
down to prolong things.
Since most of the variation in foreclosure timelines is at the the state or municipal level,
we consider the local impact of slowing down the rate of foreclosure in a single city, taking
national lender balance sheets as given. That is, we hold Pt fixed for this policy only. To
incorporate the policy into our model, we continue to assume that homeowners becomes
delinquent at the rate ιt. However, we now further assume that a maximum Φ of the housing
stock can be foreclosed upon each week due to institutional or legal constraints. In particular,
we set Φ to half of the maximum rate of foreclosure completions in the baseline model, which
corresponds to limiting the total number of foreclosures to 2.20% of the total local housing
28In practice, default and foreclosure can have significant welfare effects that are outside the scope of
our model. For example, defaulting is costly for households. Foreclosures have significant non-pecuniary
costs and lead to worse outcomes for children (Diamond et al., 2019), , adversely affect future employment
outcomes (Brevoort and Cooper, 2013) and carry a significant cost of social stigma (Guiso et al., 2013).
Furthermore, default and foreclosure amplify price declines in our model, and these declines in housing
prices can have their own welfare impacts by impeding borrowing by households and firms (Iacoviello, 2005;
Chaney et al., 2012; Adelino et al. 2015) and through aggregate demand effects (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Mian
and Sufi, 2014).
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Table 8: Effects of Limiting Foreclosure Completions
ω ∆ logPagg ∆ logPnd Total Foreclosures
Baseline (No Policy) -0.388 -0.289 8.37%
0 -0.363 -0.301 9.24%
1/(3×52) -0.339 -0.281 7.38%
1/(2×52) -0.335 -0.278 7.05%
1/(1×52) -0.329 -0.273 6.53%
Notes: The table shows the peak-to-trough decline in log aggregate prices, log non-distressed prices, and the
total foreclosures from 2006 to 2013 under each policy. All policies are fore a local intervention that does
not affect the representative lender’s balance sheet.
stock in a given year.29
Limiting foreclosure completions results in an equilibrium backlog of foreclosure starts
waiting to be completed during the crisis. We assume that homeowners in the backlog are
randomly processed. Finally, due to the lag, homeowners who are delinquent but who have
not been foreclosed upon have the opportunity to “cure” out of foreclosure by becoming
current on their loan, which we assume occurs to underwater homeowners each period with
probability ω. This allows us to evaluate how the effectiveness of the policy depends on the
rate at which homeowners recover from a liquidity shock such as a long-term unemployment
spell. Homeowners also cure if prices rise to the point that they have positive equity, in
which case they can sell their house.
Our results are reported in Table 8. We first consider the case in which homeowners
never cure from their liquidity shock, so ω = 0. In this case, slowing down foreclosures is
actually mildly counterproductive. While there is a 6.44% smaller decline in the aggregate
price index, this is purely a compositional effect, and the non-distressed price index actually
falls by 4.15% more.
To understand why slowing down foreclosures makes non-distressed price declines larger,
recall that the non-distressed average price p¯nt is a constant markup over the seller’s value
function V nt . By equation (6), the seller’s value function is equivalent to holding a financial
perpetuity which costs mn each period but pays out θ/λ each period with time-varying
probability equal to the probability that a seller transacts with a buyer. A policy of slowing
down foreclosures leads to two competing forces on the value of this claim. First, in any given
period, the policy reduces the imbalance between the number of buyers and sellers, leading
to a smaller peak-to-trough decline in the equilibrium probability of a seller transacting.
However, the policy also delays the recovery, so that the decline in the seller’s probability of
29Note that capping the total number of foreclosure completions allowed in a given period is just one way
to implement a slowing down policy. Alternatively, one could simply assume that foreclosure completions
occur at some rate σf . We have explored this policy and find similar qualitative and quantitative results.
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sale lasts longer. In our baseline calibration, the latter effect weakly dominates, leading to
lower prices, and ultimately more default. Because of the lengthened crisis, few homeowners
cure by coming above water. The relative strength of the these two forces is a numerical
result and depends on our calibration.30
When homeowners exogenously cure (ω > 0), slowing down the pace of foreclosures can
reduce the the severity of the crisis if ω is high enough because since some homeowners recover
before they are foreclosed upon, leading to a smaller price-default spiral. Quantitatively, if
ω = 1/(2 ∗ 52) so that homeowners cure on average after two years, halving the maximum
flow of foreclosures reduces the non-distressed price decline by 3.81%. If ω = 1/52, the same
policy reduces the non-distressed price decline by 5.54%. Given the evidence of long-term
scarring for displaced workers in the labor literature, ω is likely low in practice. However,
our results suggest that if policy makers expect a quick recovery either in the labor market
or in house prices, slowing down foreclosures may be modestly effective.
6.2 Government Cash or Equity Injections
We now turn our attention to three policy interventions implemented at the national level
which can affect lender balance sheets and once again let the pre-approval probability Pt be
endogenous.
The first policy we consider is an additional government equity injection into the financial
sector. Our baseline calibration has such an intervention already built into it to reflect the
25% bailout of lenders losses during the crisis by the Federal government. We begin our
analysis by considering the impact of larger government bailouts of financial institutions.
Specifically, we consider the impact of cash injections equal to 30%, 40%, and 50% of bank
losses
The results from this policy experiment are reported in the first three rows of Table 9.
The baseline calibration with a cash injection of 25% of banking sector losses leads to a non-
distressed price index log decline of -0.289 and a foreclosure rate of 8.34%. The present-value
cost to the government is $1,584, calculated on a per household basis.31 32 A 30% injection
of cash as a percentage of losses results in a 10.67% smaller non-distressed price decline and
a 8.39% reduction in the number of foreclosures and costs $1,619 per household. A 40%
injection of cash as a percentage of losses results in a 20.52% smaller non-distressed price
decline and a 17.07% reduction in the number of foreclosures and costs $1,819 per household.
30For example, if sellers discount the future by more, then the first effect can dominate.
31Formulae for the cost to the government of each policy can be found in the appendix.
32These figures reflect the cost of a cash bailout. A better policy is likely to purchase preferred stock.
Since the lender does not default along the perfect foresight equilibrium path, this constitutes a riskless
investment on the part of the government.
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Table 9: National Policy Interventions
Policy ∆ logPnd Total Foreclosures Per-Household Cost
Baseline (25% Bailout) -0.289 8.34% $1,584
30% Bailout -0.258 7.64% $1,619
40% Bailout -0.230 6.92% $1,819
50% Bailout -0.220 6.73% $2,175
25% Bailout, $5K Principal Reduction -0.272 7.59% $1,782
25% Bailout, $10K Principal Reduction -0.259 6.98% $1,917
25% Bailout, σg = 1/52 -0.159 4.98% $2,150
Notes: The table shows the peak-to-trough decline in log non-distressed prices, the total foreclosures from
2006 to 2013, and per-household costs to the government. The intervention is a national intervention that
affects the representative lender’s balance sheet. The policy is as indicated, and formulae for computing the
per-household cost are in the appendix.
A 50% injection of cash as a percentage of losses results in a 23.88% smaller price decline
and a 19.30% reduction in foreclosures. It costs $2,175 per household.
Additional government bailouts of the financial sector ameliorate the impact of the hous-
ing crisis by increasing lender equity and thus reducing the amount by which the repre-
sentative lender has to ration pre-approvals, a force which accounts for 22.6 percent of the
decline in non-distressed prices. This reduced rationing has a direct effect on market tight-
ness and drives up non-distressed prices, which brings some households above water, reduces
default, and undoes some of the price-default spiral. The effect of additional equity injec-
tions is strong because the 10% capital requirement implies that for each 1% increase in
bank equity, the bank can increase the size of the balance sheet by 10%.33
6.3 Mortgage Modification
The next policy we consider is principal reduction, which was implemented as part of the
HAMP PRA program. This program financed principal forgiveness for homeowners, with
the principal reduction capped at the point where the LTV ratio reached 115%. Using a
regression discontinuity design, Ganong and Noel (2019a) document that, controlling for
payment reduction, HAMP principal reductions for underwater homeowners had no effect
on the short-run incidence of default. Scharlemann and Shore (2016) report similar results
using a regression kink design.
To keep our analysis in line with the actual HAMP program, which only reduced principal
up to the point where LTV ratios reached 115%, we consider a policy which offers principal
forgiveness of Φ dollars or until 115% LTV is reached (whichever is less) to all homeowners
33Note that higher levels of private equity injections during the crisis would have similar effects.
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with LTV ratios exceeding 115% at the onset of the crisis. We assume that the government
pays the residual principal and interest payments to the bank throughout the life of the
loan, so the bank does not incur any losses on its balance sheet. To isolate the impact of
the principal reduction, we assume that incidence of the liquidity shocks remains constant.
Finally, we again consider this policy as incremental, taking the baseline 25% lender bailout
as given.
The quantitative results for principal reduction are in the fourth and fifth rows of Table
9. Relative to a baseline with no principal reduction, $5,000 principal reduction up to a
115% LTV cap lowers the price decline by 5.83% and the incidence of foreclosure by 9.04%
and has a total cost of $1,782 per household. $10,000 principal reduction up to a 115% LTV
cap lowers the price decline by 10.47% and the incidence of default by 16.35% and has a
total cost of $1,917 per household.
The first result to note about principal reduction is that it can be effective at mitigat-
ing price declines and foreclosures. At first blush, this may seem to contradict to micro-
econometric studies like Ganong and Noel (2019a) and Scharlemann and Shore (2016) who
find that HAMP principal forgiveness had no effect on default at the margin. However, if
we were to compare underwater households who receive principal reduction to those who
do not in our model, we would also find no difference in short-run default rates since the
policy does not bring households above water. Our model is thus entirely consistent with
their micro findings.
The effectiveness of principal reductions is instead due to two equilibrium effects that
are absorbed into a constant or fixed effect in micro-econometric studies. First, the policy
affects default in the future because more households are above water than otherwise would
be as prices rise.. As agents are forward-looking, the reduction in future default feeds back
into a smaller price decline at the start of the crisis. Second, principal reductions act as an
indirect bailout to lenders, as households that receive a liquidity shock and default have a
smaller principal balance than they otherwise would have. Our equilibrium model suggests
that micro studies on the impact of principal forgiveness like Ganong and Noel (2019a)
and Scharlemann and Shore (2016) may understate the full impact of programs like HAMP
because they cannot account for the equilibrium impacts of the policy.
The second result to note about principal reduction is that it is less cost-effective than
the other policies we consider, as shown in Table 9. This is because principal forgiveness
is imperfectly targeted. Intuitively, the government cannot tell who will receive a liquidity
shock in the future and thus gives principal reduction to all households with sufficiently
high LTV, which drives up the cost of the policy relative to a policy that targets households
conditional on default. The other two policies are better-targeted because they condition on
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default: Equity injections cover a fraction of lender losses due to default, and government
purchases of distressed homes only occur in the event of a foreclosure. These policies thus
do not spend money to mitigate foreclosures that may not occur, while principal reduction
does.
6.4 Government Purchase of Distressed Houses
The final policy intervention we consider is a government facility to purchase distressed homes
and then slowly re-introduce them to the market. In our model, foreclosures create listings
today but potential buyers are locked out of the market, which puts downward pressure on
prices. Slowing down the rate at which foreclosed properties are listed on the market for sale
could address this dynamic imbalance between supply and demand and lead to smaller price
declines and less default. This does not occur in equilibrium because competitive lenders do
not internalize the fact that by listing a property today they are creating more foreclosures
and lowering the price they can command for a foreclosure. This externality creates scope
for government intervention.
We implement such an intervention within our model by assuming that the government
sets up a facility to purchase distressed homes at the price of V dt so that lenders are indifferent
between listing the property for sale and selling it to the government. The government then
re-introduces REOs into the market at the rate σg. The government pays per-period costs
md while keeping the home off the market. Because the house is vacant, the government
experiences increased depreciation and higher maintenance costs just as with lenders selling
a foreclosure. When a house is re-introduced by the government back into the market at
time T, the government sells the house to a market-maker at a price V dT .
Our results are reported in the final row of table Table 9. The policy is highly effective:
A rate of σg = 1/52, corresponding to keeping the house off the market for an average of 1
year, leads to a 44.8% smaller national price decline and a 40.3% reduction in the number of
foreclosures. The total cost to the government is $2,150 per household. By contrast, Table
9 shows that a 50% lender bailout costs the government $2,175 per household but delivers
significantly smaller reductions in default and non-distressed prices. The policy is thus quite
cost-effective, even accounting for the government’s high maintenance costs when they hold
homes off the market.
The reason this policy intervention is highly effective is that it mitigates both the fore-
closure flag and lender rationing channels discussed in Section 4.34 It clearly mitigates the
foreclosure flag effect by directly addressing the dynamic imbalance of demand and supply
34Recall that, even in the absence of any lender rationing, the foreclosure flag effect itself accounts for
22.2% of the total price decline.
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created by the foreclosure process, as described above. The lender rationing channel is also
weakened because of the interaction between the foreclosure flag and lender rationing ef-
fects: By weakening the foreclosure flag effect, there is less default and smaller bank losses,
which then mitigates the credit rationing by banks. The total result is significantly less
amplification during the crisis and a far smaller price-default spiral.
Finally, it is useful to distinguish this policy from the policy of limiting foreclosure com-
pletions discussed in Section 6.1. At first glance, these policies may appear similar, but they
are actually quite different. Recall that the foreclosure flag effect occurs because when a fore-
closure happens, the home is sold now but the foreclosed-upon household does not return
to the market until the foreclosure flag is removed from its credit record. The government
facility directly addresses the foreclosure flag effect by holding the house off the market until
demand picks up. Slowing down foreclosures, by contrast, delays the foreclosure, but the
dynamic imbalance is unchanged because upon foreclosure completion the house is sold im-
mediately while the foreclosed-upon homeowner is locked out. The foreclosure flag effect is
thus just as potent, so the effects of the slowing down foreclosures policy is far more limited
when cure rates are low.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a structural analysis to show that foreclosures have important equilibrium
effects that exacerbate housing downturns and to analyze foreclosure mitigation policy. We
develop a quantitative search model of the housing market in which default erodes lender
balance sheets, lenders sell foreclosed homes at a discount due to high holding costs, and
homeowners who are foreclosed upon cannot immediately purchase another home. Lender
rationing and the impact of foreclosure flags on potential buyers’ credit records reduce the
number of buyers relative to sellers, worsening seller outside options. Sellers, and particularly
REO sellers, become highly motivated to sell, while buyers become more choosey due to the
presence of distressed REO sellers offering properties at a discount. These effects create
downward pressure on non-distressed prices, which in turn leads to additional default and a
price-default spiral.
In our quantitative analysis, these equilibrium effects prove crucial to match the empir-
ically observed declines in house prices and transaction volumes during the housing crisis.
Furthermore, the model with default is better able to match the non-linearity in boom size
relative to bust size across cities relative to a model without default. The deterioration in
lender balance sheets generates a decline in non-distressed prices of 22.6 percent, while the
foreclosure flag and choosey buyer effects cause an additional 25.4 percent decline.
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The presence of sizable equilibrium effects of foreclosures opens the door to for foreclosure
mitigation policy to ameliorate a downturn, and we use our quantitative model to compare
several policies. The most cost-effective policy we consider is a government intervention that
holds foreclosures off the market until demand rebounds, thereby rectifying the dynamic
imbalance of supply and demand caused by foreclosures. Lender equity injections are also
quite effective. The least cost-effective policy is principal reduction as implemented by
HAMP, although it is more effective than a partial-equilibrium analysis would suggest since
it acts as a poorly targeted bailout of lenders. Finally, slowing down foreclosures can be
counterproductive if households do not cure out of foreclosure quickly enough because it
lengthens the crisis, which offsets the benefits of having fewer foreclosures on the market at
any one time. However, this policy can be effective if the cure rate is sufficiently fast.
Overall, our findings suggest that models of the housing market need to incorporate
features that allow for default to cause overshooting in a bust. Our findings also imply that
foreclosures and some foreclosure policies have far stronger effects than those implied by
micro studies that absorb the equilibrium effects into a constant or fixed effects. We hope
future work continues to refine our understanding of the equilibrium effects of foreclosures
and their role in shaping foreclosure policy.
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A Model Details
In this appendix, we provide technical details on the model which were omitted in the main
text.
We first provide the Bellman equation describing the value function of a homeowner.
Recall that:
V ht (h,Φ) = h+ βEtΓt+1 (L (Φ) , µ (Φ)) ,
where h is the idiosyncratic valuation. The value function Γt is:
Γt (L, µ) = (1− γ1 [L ≤ V nt ]− ιt1 [L > V nt ]) ((γL + µ)L+ Γt+1 ((1− γL)L, µ))
+ γ1 [L ≤ V nt ] (V nt − (1 + µ)L+ PtBt (Φt) + (1− Pt)Rvt )
+ γ1 [L > V nt ]Υγ + ιt1 [L > V
n
t ]
(
Rft + Υι
)
,
where:
Rvt = −rt + β
[
γrBt (Φt) + (1− γr)EtRvr+1
]
Rft = −rt + β
[
σBt (Φt) + (1− σ)EtRvr+1
]
are the value functions for being denied pre-approval and having a foreclosure flag, respec-
tively. Υγ < 0 and Υι < 0 respectively denote the utility costs of lock-in and default. As an
important special case, note that if there is no default, i.e. ιt = 0 and µ = 1/β − 1, then the
present-value of all future loan payments is equal to the loan balance. This implies that:
V ht (h,Φ) = h− L+ βEtΓ˜t+1 (L (Φ) , µ (Φ)) ,
where:
Γ˜t (L, µ) = (1− γ1 [L ≤ V nt ]) Γ˜t+1 ((1− γL)L, µ)
+ γ1 [L ≤ V nt ] (V nt + PtBt (Φt) + (1− Pt)Rvt ) .
+ γ1 [L > V nt ]Υγ
This simplifies the equilibrium cutoff condition to:
hjt (Φ) + βEtΓ˜t+1 (L (Φ) , µ (Φ)) = βEt
[
Bt+1 (Φ) + V
j
t+1
]
.
In steady-state or if there is no lock-in along the equilibrium path, this implies that equilib-
rium cutoff rules and buyer value functions are independent of the financing terms Φ.
We next discuss the dynamics of the loan balance and pre-approved loan balance distri-
butions Gt (Φ), G
p
t (Φ) . Since it corresponds closer to our numerical implementation, instead
of providing laws of motion for these distributions, we provide the laws of motion for the
mass of people with financing terms Φ, which essentially discretizes the G (·) and Gp (·)
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distributions. We denote these masses as lΦt and v
b,Φ
t . Note that:
lΦt = ltGt (Φ)
vb,Φt = v
b
vG
p
t (Φ) .
These masses follow the dynamics:
vb,Φt+1 =
[
γPt
∑
Φ
lΦt 1 [L (Φ) < V
n
t ] + γrPtv
r
t + σPtv
f
t
]
1 [Φt = Φ]
+
(
1− qb (θt)
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
E
[
1− Ft
(
hjt(Φ)
)])
vb,Φt
and
lΦt+1 = qb (θt)
∑
j=n,d
rjtEt
[
1− Ft
(
hjt(Φ)
)]
vb,Φt
+
(
1− γ1
[
L (Φ)
1− γL ≤ V
n
t
]
− ιt1
[
L (Φ)
1− γL > V
n
t
])
l
(
L(Φ)
1−γL ,µ(Φ)
)
t .
Finally, retained earnings are given by:
∆Rt =
∑
Φ
vb,Φt µfL (Φ) +
∑
Φ
lΦt µ (Φ)L (Φ) (1− ιt1 [L (Φ) > V nt ])− µfDt,
equal to the interest collected on all loans which do not default minus the interest the lender
pays on its own debt Dt. Recall that the funds for pre-approved loans are invested in short-
term marketable securities earning the risk-free rate. The interest rate on all loans is set
such that lender’s break even in expectation. We discuss this point more fully below.
As described in the main text, we consider a steady state in which ι = 0, so defaults
are measure zero. and equity issuance is costless so P = 1. This simplifies the steady
state considerably. In particular, without default risk, the interest rate on all loans is the
risk-free rate µf . Furthermore, equilibrium in the housing market is invariant to the current
homeowner loan balance distribution as long as no homeowners are underwater, which is
the case in steady state. Additionally, the equilibrium cutoffs hj (Φ) are independent of the
financing terms Φ.
B Computational Appendix
B.1 Steady-State System
In this section, we provide the full system of equations which solves for the steady-state of
our model. Recall that ι = 0 in the steady-state and lenders can costlessly raise equity so
P = 1. This implies that vd = 0, vf = 0, and vr = 0 in steady-state. Also, with no default,
the buyer’s value function and the equilibrium cutoffs are independent of Φ, and we suppress
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this notation. Dropping the t subscript to denote a steady state value, the full system is:
l = (1− γ) l + vbqb (θ) (1− F (hn))
vv = γl + vn [1− qs (θ) (1− F (hn))] + va
vb = γl + vb [1− qs (θ) (1− F (hn))]
vn + va = vv
vrs + va = ζvb
V n = mn + βV˜ n + qs (θ) (1− F (hn))ψE [h− hn|h ≥ hn]
V d = md + βV d + qs (θ)
(
1− F (hd))ψE [h− hd|h ≥ hd]
B = −r + βB + qs (θ) (1− F (hn)) (1− ψ)E [h− hn|h ≥ hn]
V˜ n = r + βV˜ n
V˜ n = V n
Γ˜ = γ (V n +B) + β (1− γ) Γ˜
hn + βΓ˜ = β [B + V n]
hd + βΓ˜ = β
[
B + V d
]
The first three steady-state equations derive from the laws of motion for the homeowners,
the stocks of non owner-occupied homes, and buyers respectively. The next equation says
that the number of listed homes and homes being rented out must equal the total stock of
non owner-occupied homes. The next is the market clearing condition for the rental market.
The following four equations derive from the Bellman equations for the seller and buyer
value functions. After those we have the equilibrium indifference condition between listing
and renting. Then we have the equation pinning down the value of homeownership and
finally the equations pinning down the equilibrium cutoff rules. Note that the expression for
Γ˜ reflects the fact that there is no default, no lock-in, and P = 1 in the steady state. Under
the exponential distribution, E [h− hj|h ≥ hj] = 1/λ for j = n, d which further simplifies
the numerical computation of the steady state.
B.2 Solving for the Downturn
We solve for the perfect foresight impulse response to the shocks we use to trigger a downturn
under the assumption that households who buy during the downturn do not subsequently
default or become locked-in. That is, all default arises from people who are already home-
owners at the time of the crisis. We then verify ex-post that this is actually the case.35
This makes solving the model considerably simpler. First, it implies that the interest rate
on loans issued during the crisis is equal to the lender’s discount rate µf . It further implies
that the buyer value function and the equilibrium cutoffs do not depend on financing terms
Φ. We therefore suppress this notation in what follows. Finally, if new homeowners are not
expected to default, the value function for being a homeowner is considerably simpler.
We then discretize the loan balance distribution using and equally-spaced grid with 51
35Recall that all loans are pre-approved at an LTV of 80% relative to the average price. Because non-
distressed prices rise on the equilibrium path, this implies that there is no re-default.
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points. The equations describing equilibrium in the housing market are:
V nt = m
n + βEtV
n
t+1 + q
s (θt) (1− Ft (hnt ))ψEt [h− hnt |h ≥ hnt ]
V dt = m
d + βEtV
d
t+1 + q
s (θt)
(
1− Ft
(
hdt
))
ψEt
[
h− hdt |h ≥ hdt
]
Bt = −rt + βEtBt+1 + qb (θ (t))
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
(
1− Ft
(
hjt
))
(1− ψ)Et
[
h− hjt |h ≥ hjt
]
Γ˜t = γ (V
n
t + PtBt + (1− Pt)Rvt ) + β (1− γ)EtΓt+1
Rvt = −rt + β
[
γrBt (Φt) + (1− γr)EtRvr+1
]
V˜ nt = V
n
t
V˜ nt = rt + βEtV˜
n
t+1
hdt + βEtΓ˜t+1 = βEt
[
Bt+1 + V
d
t+1
]
hnt + βEtΓ˜t+1 = βEt
[
Bt+1 + V
n
t+1
]
p¯nt = ψEt [h− hnt |h ≥ hnt ] + βEtV nt
p¯dt = ψEt
[
h− hdt |h ≥ hdt
]
+ βEtV
d
t
va (t) + vrs = ζ (vb (t) + vf (t) + vr (t))
vv (t) = va (t) + vn (t)
L∗t = φp¯
n
t
Note that L∗t is the size of pre-approved loans in period t. So the pre-approval financing
terms in period t are Φt = (L
∗
t , µf ) .
We next describe the laws of motion. We first set up some notation. Let li0 denote the
stock of homeowners at the time of the crisis with a loan balance equal to the value of the
ith grid point Li0. Then, l
i
t is the amount of these initial homeowners which still remain in
the same house at time t. We let Lit denote their loan balance at time t. As people buy
homes during the crisis, they flow into a stock which we denote as l0t . So l
0
0 = 0. According
to our assumption, which we verify ex-post, homeowners in the l0t bin do not default along
the perfect foresight impulse response. Finally, let L0t denote the average loan size among
homeowners in l0t and L
b
t the average pre-approval loan size at time t. Define:
L¯0t = l
0
tL
0
t
L¯bt = v
b
tL
b
t
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The full set of laws of motion are:
l0t+1 = (1− γ) l0t + vbtqbt (θt)
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
(
1− Ft
(
hjt
))
lit+1 =
(
1− γ1 [Lit ≤ V nt ]− ιt1 [Lit > V nt ]) lit
vbt+1 = γPt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
+ γrPtv
r
t
+σPtv
f
t + v
b
t
[
1− qb (θt)
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
(
1− Ft
(
hjt
))]
vrt+1 = (1− γrPt) vrt + γ (1− Pt)
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
+ σ (1− Pt) vft
vvt+1 = γ
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
+ vnt [1− qs (θt) (1− Ft (hnt ))] + vat
vdt+1 = ιt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
]
+ vdt
[
1− qs (θt)
(
1− Ft
(
hdt
))]
vft+1 = (1− σ)vft + ιt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
]
Lit+1 = (1− γL)Lit
L¯bt+1 =
(
1− qbt (θt)
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
(
1− Ft
(
hjt
)))
L¯bt
+
[
γPt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
+ γrPtv
r
t + σPtv
f
t
]
L∗t
L¯0t+1 = (1− γ) (1− γL) L¯0t + qbt (θt)
∑
j=n,d
vjt
vnt + v
d
r
(
1− Ft
(
hjt
))
L¯bt
Note that we only need to keep track of the total stock of buyers since equilibrium cutoffs
do not depend on Φ. We finally describe equilibrium in the mortgage market. Recall that
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in steady-state, the lender is at its capital requirement. The set of equations is:
∆Et = ιt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
] (
V dt − Lit
)
∆Dt =
[
γ
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
+ γrv
r
t + σv
f
t
]
L∗t
∆Qt = (γ + (1− γ) γL)L0t + γ
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]
Lit + ιt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
]
Lit
+
∑
i
lit
(
1− γ
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit ≤ V nt
]− ιt∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
])
γLL
i
t
∆Dt P˜t −∆Qt = χ∆It + ∆Et /χ
∆It = µf
[
L0t + L
b
t +
∑
i
lit
(
1− ιt1
[
Lit > V
n
t
])
Lit
]
Pt = P˜t1 [t < Te] + 1 [t ≥ Te]
Here, ∆Et is the change in the lender’s equity position due to losses, ∆
D
t is the total demand
for new financing, ∆Qt reflects the decreases on the asset side of the balance sheet due to
moving, default, and payment, and ∆It is interest earnings. P˜t is set so that the lender
continues to meet its regulatory capital requirement. At time TE, the lender is able to
recapitalize, setting Pt = 1.
36 The model is solved using the Dynare software package. For
the cross-cities version of the model, the last equation is replaced by the time path of Pt
from the national model.
C Data Sources and Calculations
C.1 Data Sources
The main data source is proprietary data from CoreLogic, which we supplement with data
from the U.S. Census, American Housing Survey, Saiz (2010), the Wharton Land-Use Reg-
ulation Survey, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CoreLogic provides us with a monthly data set for the nation and the 100 largest CBSAs37
36Along the equilibrium path, P˜t < 1 for t < TE .
37By CBSA code and name, they are: 10420 Akron, OH; 10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; 10740 Al-
buquerque, NM; 10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ; 12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA;
12420 Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX; 12540 Bakersfield-Delano, CA; 12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD;
12940 Baton Rouge, LA; 13644 Bethesda-Rockville-Frederick, MD; 13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL; 14484
Boston-Quincy, MA; 14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT; 15380 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY; 15764
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA; 15804 Camden, NJ; 16700 Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville,
SC; 16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC; 16974 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL; 17140 Cincinnati-
Middletown, OH-KY-IN; 17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH; 17820 Colorado Springs, CO; 17900 Columbia,
SC; 18140 Columbus, OH; 19124 Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX; 19380 Dayton, OH; 19740 Denver-Aurora-
Broomfield, CO; 19804 Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI; 20764 Edison-New Brunswick, NJ; 21340 El Paso,
TX; 22744 Fort Lauderdale-Pompano; Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL; 23104 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; 23420
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for 2000-2013 compiled from public records and mortgage data. CoreLogic estimates that
its data covers 85 percent of the U.S. Our data set includes:
• The CoreLogic home price index and non-distressed home price index estimated from
public records. In cases where public records do not include price (misreported ob-
servations or states where the price is not disclosed), this data is supplemented with
data on individual mortgages that includes purchase prices. We refer to these as the
aggregate and non-distressed price indices. The CoreLogic non-distressed price index
drops REO sales and short sales from the database and re-estimates the price index
using the same methodology.
• The number of pre-foreclosure filings and completed foreclosure auctions estimated
from public records.
• Sales counts for REOs, new houses, non-REO and non-short sale resales, and short
sales estimated from public records. Because short sales are not reported separately
for much of the time frame covered by the data, we combine short sales and resales
into a non-REO existing home sales measure which we call non-distressed sales. We
calculate existing home sales by adding REO and non-distressed sales. We also use
this data to construct the REO share of existing home volume, which we seasonally
adjust.
• Estimates of 7 quantiles of the combined loan-to-value distribution for active mort-
gages: under 50%, 50%-60%, 60%-70%, 70%-80%, 80%-90%, 90%-100%, 100%-110%,
and over 110%. These statistics are compiled by CoreLogic using public records and
CoreLogic’s valuation models.
Fresno, CA; 23844 Gary, IN; 24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI; 24660 Greensboro-High Point, NC; 24860
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC; 25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT; 26180 Honolulu, HI; 26420
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX; 26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN; 27260 Jacksonville, FL; 28140 Kansas
City, MO-KS; 28940 Knoxville, TN; 29404 Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI; 29820 Las Vegas-Paradise,
NV; 30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR; 31084 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA; 31140
Louisville-Jefferson County, KY-IN; 32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; 32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR;
33124 Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL; 33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; 33460 Minneapolis-St.
Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI; 34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN; 35004 Nassau-Suffolk,
NY; 35084 Newark-Union, NJ-PA; 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT; 35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA;
35644 New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ; 35840 North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL; 36084 Oakland-
Fremont-Hayward, CA; 36420 Oklahoma City, OK; 36540 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA; 36740 Orlando-
Kissimmee-Sanford, FL; 37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA; 37764 Peabody, MA; 37964 Philadel-
phia, PA; 38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ; 38300 Pittsburgh, PA; 38900 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro,
OR-WA; 39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY; 39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-
MA; 39580 Raleigh-Cary, NC; 40060 Richmond, VA; 40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; 40380
Rochester, NY; 40900 Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA; 41180 St. Louis, MO-IL; 41620 Salt Lake
City, UT; 41700 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX; 41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA; 41884 San
Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA; 41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA; 42044 Santa Ana-
Anaheim-Irvine, CA; 42644 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA; 44140 Springfield, MA; 44700 Stockton, CA;
45060 Syracuse, NY; 45104 Tacoma, WA; 45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL; 45780 Toledo, OH;
46060 Tucson, AZ; 46140 Tulsa, OK; 47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC; 47644 Warren-
Troy-Farmington Hills, MI; 47894 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV; 48424 West Palm
Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL; 48864 Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ; 49340 Worcester, MA.
51
We seasonally adjust the raw CoreLogic house price indices, foreclosure counts, sales counts,
and delinquent and in-foreclosure loan shares using the Census Bureau’s X-12 ARIMA soft-
ware with an additive seasonal factor. For the CBSA sales counts, auctions counts, days
on the market, and REO share, we smooth the data using a 5 month moving average (2
months prior, the current month, and 2 months post) to remove spikes in the data caused
by irregular reporting at the county level.
For the calibration of the loan balance distribution and initial number of mortgages with
high LTV ratios, we adjust the CoreLogic data using data from the American Community
Survey as tabulated by the Census. The CoreLogic data only covers all active loans, while
our model corresponds to the entire owner-occupied housing stock. Consequently, we use the
ACS 3-year 2005-2007 estimates of the owner-occupied housing stock and fraction of houses
with a mortgage at the national and county level, which we aggregate to the CBSA level using
CBSA definitions.38 From this data, we construct the fraction of owner-occupied housing
units with a mortgage and the fraction of owner-occupied housing units with a second lien
or home equity loan. We use these estimates to adjust the loan balance distribution so it
represents the entire owner-occupied housing stock and in our regressions to construct the
fraction of owner-occupied houses with over 80 percent LTV.
The LTV data is first available for March 2006, which roughly corresponds to the eve
of the housing bust as the seasonally-adjusted national house price index reached is peak
in March 2006. To approximate the size of the run-up, we average the seasonally-adjusted
price index for March-May 2003 and March-May 2006 to calculate the change in log prices
for 2003 to 2006.
We also calculate the maximum peak-to-trough log change in seasonally-adjusted aggre-
gate and non-distressed prices, smoothed and seasonally-adjusted non-REO volume, and the
average REO share for 2008 to 2013 for each geographical area. We estimate the minimum
value between March 2006 and September 2013 and the maximum value between January
2002 and December 2007. We implement these restrictions so that the addition of counties to
the CoreLogic data set prior to 2002 does not distort our results. We calculate the fraction of
the owner-occupied housing stock that was foreclosed upon by adding up completed foreclo-
sure auctions between March 2006 and September 2013 and dividing by the owner-occupied
housing stock in 2006 as calculated from the ACS. Again, our results are not sensitive to the
choice of dates.
From the 100 CBSAs we drop the Syracuse, New York CBSA which has incomplete data
and the Indianapolis CBSA which has bad data on the 2006 loan balance distribution. We
also exclude the Birmingham, Alabama CBSA from calculations on sales volume is dropped
because a major county stopped reporting to CoreLogic in the middle of the downturn so the
sales volume series is discontinuous. In the main text we exclude two CBSAs in the greater
Detroit area—Detroit and Warren—because they experienced large price declines without a
prior boom and thus create an exaggerated non-linear relationship between boom size and
bust size. Below we show results including these two CBSAs, which are robust to including
them. We thus have 97 CBSAs for price and 96 for sales volume.
38The 3-year ACS estimates include estimates of the housing stock and houses with a mortgage for all
counties with over 20,000 residents. For a few MSAs, one or more small counties are not included in the
ACS data. The bias on our constructed estimates of the fraction of owner-occupied homes with a mortgage
and with a second lien or home equity loan due to these small missing counties is minimal.
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The data on the share of the housing stock converted from owner-occupied to renter-
occupied uses data from the American Community survey. Assuming that there are no
purpose-built single family detached rental units, the share of the owner-occupied stock
converted to renter-occupied from 2006 to 2013 is equal to the stock of single family detached
rental homes from 2006 to 2013 divided by the mean stock of single family detached homes
in the CBSA for 2005 to 2007. This is likely an upper bound because single-family detached
homes were more likely to be converted in this time period. Note that the ACS data is not
available at the CBSA level, so we link each CBSA to a MSA (made up of multiple CBSAs
in some cases) and give each CBSA the same share converted as the overall MSA.
C.2 Robustness of Empirical Results in Section 1
For robustness tests, we merge data from Saiz (2010) into the CBSA data. The Saiz data
includes his estimate of unusable land due to terrain, the housing supply elasticity, and the
Wharton Land-Use Regulation Survey score for each CBSA. We are able to match every
CBSA we have data on except for Sacramento CA and Honolulu HI. Summary statistics for
the complete data set are in Table 10.
Table 10: MSA Summary Statistics
Unweighted Mean SD Min Max N
Max ∆ log (P) -0.326 0.219 -0.950 -0.028 97
Max ∆ log (P
non-distressed
) -0.278 0.195 -0.880 -0.035 97
Max ∆ log (Salesnon-distressed) -1.124 0.295 -1.918 -0.390 96
SalesREO
SalesExisting
0.307 0.163 0.084 0.796 96
% Foreclosed 0.091 0.073 0.011 0.438 96
∆ log (Price)03−06 0.306 0.181 0.038 0.729 97
Share LTV > 80% 0.143 0.076 0.026 0.328 97
Frac Second Mort, 06 0.203 0.053 0.026 0.290 97
Saiz Land Unav 0.280 0.213 0.009 0.796 95
Wharton Land Reg 0.228 0.711 -1.239 1.892 95
Notes: Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis. All data is from CoreLogic. Data is for
the 100 largest CBSAs not including Syracuse NY and Detroit and Warren MI. For sales, the REO share
and percent foreclosed, Birmingham AL is also omitted. For the Saiz land unavailability and the Wharton
land-use regulation, Sacramento CA and Honolulu HI are omitted.
As a robustness test, Table 11 shows regression results when equation (1) is augmented
to include the fraction of homes with a second mortgage in 2006, the land unavailability
index, and the land use regulation index, and the interacted variable X is the z score of the
share of mortgages with an LTV above 80% in 2006. We add the fraction of individuals with
a second mortgage or home equity loan to the regression because these loans have received
attention in analyses of the downturn (Mian and Sufi, 2011) and we want to make sure they
are not driving the result. We use a land unavailability index and the Wharton land use
regulation index from Saiz (2010) to proxy for the housing supply elasticity. We estimate:
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Yi = β0 + β1∆03−06 log (Pi) + β2 [∆03−06 log (Pi)]
2 (22)
+β3 (Z Share LTV2006,i > 80%) + β4 (∆03−06 log (Pi)× Z LTV2006,i > 80%)
+β5
(
Z % Second Mortgage2006,i
)
+ β6 (∆03−06 log (Pi)× Z % Second2006,i)
+β7 (Z Saiz Land Unavailabilityi) + β8 (Z Wharton Land Use Regulationi) + εi.
The key patterns in the main text continue to be present in this table. Table 12 shows the
results are robust to including the two outlier CBSAs in the greater Detroit area that are
dropped form the main analysis, although the results are less statistically significant.
C.3 Calibration Target Moments
This section provides details on the target moments used in the calibration in Section 3.
C.3.1 Steady State Moments
We target a mean house price for a non-distressed sales of $300,000 as an approximation to
Adelino et al.’s (2012) mean house price of $298,000 for 10 MSAs. In reporting results, we
normalize this initial house price to 1. The results are not sensitive to this figure, which is
a normalization.
As discussed in the text, REO discounts are hard to estimate due to unobserved quality.
Most estimates of REO discounts prior to the downturn were approximately 20 percent, but
some estimates are closer to 10 percent (see Clauretie and Denshvary, 2009 and Campbell et
al., 2011). In the main text we use 12.5 percent, which is a conservative figure that attributes
a substantial amount of the discount to unobserved quality, and in the appendix we present
results for 10 percent and 15 percent discounts.
We target a time on the market for non-distressed houses of 26 weeks as in Piazzesi and
Schneider (2009). This number is a bit higher than some papers that use Multiple Listing
Service Data such as Anenberg (2016) and Springer (1996), likely because of imperfect
adjustment for withdrawn listings and re-listings.
We target a ratio of buyer to seller time on the market is 1.117 from Genesove and Han’s
(2012) analysis of National Association of Realtor surveys.
C.3.2 Externally-Calibrated Parameter Values
γ is baed on the median tenure for owner occupants of approximately 9 years comes from
table 3-9 of the American Housing Survey National Summary Report and Tables for 1997-
2005.
We use ζ = 0.65 in our baseline calibration and ζ = 0.70 in robustness tests. Recall that
ζ is the fraction of floor space that a renter occupies relative to an owner. We calibrate this
parameter using microdata from the American Housing Survey from 2001 to 2013. Table
13 reports the median (using survey weights) renter-to-owner ratio for a number of different
statistics for all renters and for only renters who have moved in the past two years. Across
years and measures, the estimates range between 0.5 and 0.7. Figure 7 panel A shows a
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Table 13: AHS Microdata: Various Measures of ζ Across Years
Metric Sqft / Lot Lot Size / Sqft / Lot Lot Size /
Sqft Person Size Person Sqft Person Size Person
Sample All All All All Movers Movers Movers Movers
2001 0.529 0.640 0.593 0.705 0.529 0.600 0.511 0.600
2003 0.529 0.656 0.510 0.667 0.529 0.600 0.441 0.50
2005 0.506 0.639 0.786 0.786 0.506 0.587 0.786 0.667
2007 0.500 0.625 0.661 0.667 0.528 0.587 0.620 0.545
2009 0.528 0.625 0.686 0.667 0.544 0.594 0.643 0.583
2011 0.532 0.625 0.707 0.576 0.544 0.583 0.571 0.455
2013 0.542 0.625 0.590 0.554 0.542 0.600 0.556 0.462
Mean 0.524 0.634 0.648 0.660 0.532 0.592 0.590 0.545
Note: This table shows the median owner to renter ratio for the specified metric for each year. The first
four columns use all renters, while the last four use only renters who moved in the previous two years. The
last row shows the mean across years.
Figure 7: Histograms of Renter to Owner Square Footage Ratios
Note: The figure shows histograms of the median ratio of square feet per person for renters to owners. The
left panel shows 28 census region × years and the right panel shows 138 SMSA × years with over 100
observations for both renters and owners in each cell.
histogram of the median renter-to-owner ratio of square feet per person by census region
× year and panel shows the same histogram by SMSA × year (the AHS uses 1980 SMSA
definitions for metropolitan areas) for SMSA × year cells with over 100 observations for both
renters and owners. For region × years, the average is 0.61 with a standard deviation of
.032. For SMSA × years, the mean is 0.62 with a standard deviation of .075. Because lower
numbers imply less conversion and a stronger foreclosure effect, we conservatively choose
ζ = 0.65 for our baseline calibration and use ζ = 0.70 for robustness tests.
σ is calibrated based on bank, FHFA, and GSE policies on the amount of time one
cannot obtain a loan after a foreclosure as described in the main text. The policies for
how long a buyer must wait after a foreclosure to be eligible for a mortgage can be found
at http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-can-i-get-mortgage-after-foreclosure.html
57
and http://www.zillow.com/blog/boomerang-buyers-buying-again-after-a-foreclosure-or-short-
sale-102457/.
As described in the text, the size of the government bailout is set to 25% based on a
$130 billion capital injection (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010) relative to losses of $520 billion
(Begenau et al., 2019).
C.3.3 Loan Balance Distribution
The loan balance distribution we use has 51 points distributed in 2% LTV intervals. Recalling
that the steady state prices is $300,000, this implies that the LTV bins have boundaries
with intervals of $6,000. We estimate the mass in each bin by matching the CDF in the
model to the CDF implied by CoreLogic data on six quantiles of the combined loan-to-value
distribution for active mortgages: under 50%, 50%-60%, 60%-70%, 70%-80%, 80%-90%,
90%-100%, and over 100%. We put all of the mass at or above 100% LTV at 100% LTV. We
match the CDF exactly assuming that the mass is distributed equally to each bin within a
quantile.
C.3.4 Time Path of Liquidity Shocks ι
We feed in a time path for liquidity shocks ι based on the national long-run unemployment
rate. To calculate this rate, we divide the fraction of workers unemployed for 27 weeks or more
(which we will call the long-run unemployment rate) by the total labor force as estimated by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We then take a moving average of the unemployment rate
that includes 6 months on either side of the month in question. We shift the series 6 months
forward so that the shock corresponds to entering long-run unemployment rather than hitting
the 6 month threshold. The time series we choose begins with date zero being August 2008,
and we subtract off the long run unemployment rate from this date and normalize this to
zero. We continue for 7.6 years until the long-run unemployment rate returns to its August
2008 level.
We adjust the ι series for each CBSA by the ratio of the maximum estimated long-run
unemployment rate in the CBSA to the national maximum long-run unemployment rate.
The BLS only reports aggregate unemployment rates by CBSA, not unemployment rates
by duration. To estimate the local long-run unemployment rate, we use state-level data
from the Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment Bulletin put out by the
BLS and available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/gp/laugp.htm. For each year, we regress
the state-level long-run unemployment rate on the state-level unemployment rate and use
the coefficient to predict CBSA-level long-run unemployment rates from the CBSA-level
unemployment rate. We find the maximum predicted CBSA-level long-run unemployment
rate and multiply Cι for each city by the ratio of this to the national long-run unemployment
rate.
D Model Robustness
In this appendix we present robustness checks for the model calibration and present addi-
tional results from alternate models and parameterizations. In all cases, we alter a single
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moment or parameter and repeat the same calibration procedure described in the main text.
The parameters we alter are:
• A 10 percent REO discount rather than the 12.5 percent baseline.
• ζ = 0.70 rather than ζ = 0.65. As described in the appendix, ζ = 0.70 is the upper
limit of the ratio of space occupied by renters to the space occupied by owners in the
AHS data.
• An average time out of market after a foreclosure of 2.0 years and 3.0 years rather than
2.5 years.
• γR = 1/12 assumes that renters re-apply for pre-approval after an average of 3 months
rather than 2 months.
We also solve four alternate models:
• A model in which there is no lender rationing effect and we thus assume P = 1
throughout.
• A model in which we slow down foreclosures rather than assuming they occur imme-
diately. We do so by assuming that that foreclosures take on average six months. We
allow households to cure exogenously with the average household curing in two years.
• A model in which rather than not moving, households that receive a liquidity shock
who are above water sell.
• A model with an alternate law of motion for lender equity that makes the private
capital injection additive instead of multiplicative.
Finally, we provide a cross-cities calibration in which we adjust the liquidity shock series to
account for heterogeneity across cities in the incidence of liquidity shock by multiplying the
series by the ratio of the maximum long-run unemployment rate in each CBSA relative to
the maximum-long run unemployment rate nationally.
D.1 Calibration Robustness
This subsection shows results for alternate calibrations for some of the parameters where
our baseline parameters are more speculative. Table 14 evaluates the robustness of the role
of each effect in reducing non-distressed prices. The top row reports the baseline, which is
the same as the non-distressed price index row in Table 5. Each subsequent row reports
results obtained from altering the indicated calibration target and recalibrating the model
as described in Section 3.4.
The first column reports the model’s peak to trough decline in non-distressed prices
relative to the CoreLogic national non-distressed national price index. The baseline model
almost exactly matches the CoreLogic index even though this is not a targeted moment. The
alternate models continue to do well, never straying more than 10 percent from the data.
Table 15 provides results for the cross-city model fit for these various models The top
shows the national fit, while the bottom shows the cross-cities fit, which does not change
substantially across specifications.
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Table 14: Robustness: Decomposition of Non-Distressed Price Index Effects in National
Model
Changed Model Rel No No Rationing, No Full
Calibration Target to Data Default No Choosey Buyer Rationing Model
Baseline 96.92% 51.96% 74.19% 77.40% 100%
10% REO Discount 108.58% 54.99% 74.09% 77.09% 100%
γr = 1/12 97.40% 53.82% 76.64% 79.95% 100%
σ = 1/(2 ∗ 52) 98.56% 52.83% 74.87% 78.16% 100%
σ = 1/(3 ∗ 52) 96.70% 53.21% 75.94% 79.16% 100%
ζ = .7 98.46% 52.28% 73.94% 77.24% 100%
Note: Each row is for a different robustness check in which one calibration target is changed as indicated
in the first column. Each cell indicates the fraction of the full model’s peak to trough decline in the non-
distressed price index accounted for each column’s model relative to the full model. No rationing turns off
the lender rationing effect by setting Pt = 1 . No rationing and no choosey buyer additionally turns off the
choosey buyer effect by altering the buyer’s value function so she does not take into account the possibility
of meeting an REO seller, which leaves only the foreclosure flag effect. No default turns off all of the effects
and entirely eliminates default.
D.2 Alternate Model Results
D.2.1 No Lender Rationing Effect
We now turn to a model with no lender rationing effect. We implement this by setting Pt = 1
and not imposing the equilibrium condition for Pt. This means that two of our parameters in
fitting the model to the downturn, the capital requirement and the date that lenders regain
the ability to raise equity, do nothing. Consequently, we use the other two parameters, the
scaler for the liquidity shocks and the decline in the subjective valuation of houses, to match
the decline in the aggregate price index and the fraction of the cumulative housing stock
foreclosed upon.
The results are shown in Table 16 for the national model. One can see clearly how
important the bank rationing effect is for matching non-distressed sales volume, as the model
does very poorly for this metric.
D.2.2 Slowed Down Rate of Foreclosure
Table 17 shows the results of a model in which we relax the assumption that foreclosures
occur immediately. Instead, we assume that there is a stochastic delay for foreclosures, which
occur each period with probability σf = 1/26. This is a slightly different formulation than
the one we use in Section 6.1, where we assume there is a maximum number of foreclosures
that can be completed each period, but it is more numerically convenient and so we can
introduce it into the cross-cities calibration. We are assuming that the average foreclosure
takes six months to process. We also let ω = 1/ (2 ∗ 52) so that the average person cures
out of their liquidity shock after two years. We then recalibrate everything as in the main
text. One can see that the national model fit remains similar. For the cross-cities, for
numerical reasons we do not include heterogeneity in unemployment by CBSA and instead
assume ιt = CiUnempt for all CBSAs as in Appendix D.3. The cross-city results are very
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Table 15: Robustness: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
National Data -0.388 -0.298 0.190 8.34 4.35
Baseline Model -0.388 -0.289 0.191 8.34 7.38
10% REO Discount -0.388 -0.324 0.190 8.33 7.27
γr = 1/12 -0.388 -0.290 0.190 8.35 7.28
7.34
σ = 1/(3 ∗ 52) -0.388 -0.288 0.190 8.35 7.32
ζ = .7 -0.388 -0.293 0.191 8.34 7.87
Baseline Reg Coef of 1.005 1.389 0.823 0.992 0.435
Data on Model (0.063) (0.087) (0.090) (0.069) (0.055)
R2 0.736 0.734 0.482 0.695 0.419
10% REO Discount 1.037 1.244 0.809 0.971 0.446
Coef (0.064) (0.079) (0.086) (0.067) (0.057)
R2 0.742 0.732 0.497 0.699 0.414
γr = 1/12 1.005 1.385 0.828 0.991 0.443
Coef (0.063) (0.087) (0.090) (0.069) (0.056)
R2 0.736 0.734 0.483 0.695 0.422
σ = 1/(2 ∗ 52) 1.037 1.369 0.860 1.017 0.397
Coef (0.064) (0.089) (0.094) (0.071) (0.052)
R2 0.742 0.72 0.482 0.689 0.399
σ = 1/(3 ∗ 52) 0.941 1.357 0.771 0.939 0.492
Coef (0.061) (0.084) (0.085) (0.065) (0.059)
R2 0.721 0.741 0.474 0.694 0.443
ζ = .7 1.013 1.373 0.828 1.007 0.464
Coef (0.063) (0.087) (0.090) (0.070) (0.060)
R2 0.740 0.729 0.485 0.694 0.409
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. Each set of rows if for a
different model as indicated. The top comparisons compare the data and model for the national simulation.
The bottom comparisons show the slope term of a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. This table does not include stars for statistical significance as almost all
coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
Table 16: No Lender Rationing Effect
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) ∆ log (Salesnd) Share Foreclose Convert
National Data -0.388 -0.298 -1.029 0.190 8.34 4.35
No Lender Rationing -0.389 -0.321 -0.581 0.159 8.35 3.93
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable for the national
simulation.
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Table 17: Slowed Down Rate of Foreclosure Calibration
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
National Data -0.388 -0.298 0.190 8.34 4.35
National Model -0.388 -0.289 0.191 8.34 8.34
Reg Coef of 1.146 1.405 0.993 1.246 0.359
Data on Model (0.071) (0.089) (0.107) (0.086) (0.046)
R2 0.742 0.731 0.488 0.694 0.409
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. The top comparisons
compare the data and model for the national simulation. The bottom comparisons show the slope term of
a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 18: Above-Water Households With Liquidity Shock Sell Calibration
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
National Data -0.388 -0.298 0.190 8.34 4.35
National Model -0.388 -0.325 0.132 8.34 32.60
Reg Coef of 1.028*** 1.204*** 1.136*** 0.922*** 0.709***
Data on Model (0.068) (0.085) (0.135) (0.068) (0.154)
R2 0.716 0.687 0.440 0.668 0.198
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. The top comparisons
compare the data and model for the national simulation. The bottom comparisons show the slope term of
a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
similar to the results in Appendix D.3. We conclude that our model is robust to adding
some foreclosure backlogs.
D.2.3 Above-Water Households With Liquidity Shock Sell
In the main text we assume that above-water households with an liquidity shock are able to
stay in their house. In Table 18, we report results from a variant of the model in which we
instead assume these households sell and rent until they cure out of their liquidity shock,
which occurs with probability ω = 1/52 and thus takes on average one year.
We follow the same calibration procedure except we do not calibrate to the mean REO
share and instead fix TE, the date at which lenders regain access to the equity market, at 3
years. We do so because if we try to fit the REO share, we end up with a calibration with
a very long time until capital markets reopen and a positive afrac, indicating that when the
downturn starts prices permanently rise. This does not make sense, so we abandon matching
the mean REO share. In the calibration where we ignore the mean REO share, the mean
REO share is 13.2% instead of 19.0% in the data.
The model where above-water households with liquidity shocks sell does reasonably well
matching the cross-sectional patterns. However, one can see that the model is off by an order
of magnitude for the share of the housing stock converted to rental. This is because many
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Table 19: Parameter Values Calibrated to Downturn Moments for Alternate Law of Motion
Param Value
afrac 0.728
TE 204 Weeks
∆E 0.148
Cι 0.293
households who are above water experience liquidity shocks, sell their house, and are forced
to rent. The fact that the model overshoots this target by an order of magnitude – and
by implication overstates the decline in the homeownership rate – suggests our assumption
that households who are above water and receive an liquidity shock do not sell is more
appropriate.
D.2.4 Alternate Law of Motion For Lender Equity
In the main text, we consider a law of motion for lender equity of the form:
Et+1 = Et + (1− ψ)ιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V dt − Lt
)
dG (Lt) + ∆
R
t .
We let ψ = ψG + ψE, where ψG is a government bailout as a fraction of losses, which is
calibrated to 25% based on Begenau et al. (2019), and ψE is private equity that can be
raised as a fraction of losses, which we calibrate. We prefer this approach because it puts
government and private equity injections on equal footing.
In this appendix, we consider an alternate approach as a robustness check which uses a
law of motion:
Et+1 = Et + (1− ψG) ιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V dt − Lt
)
dG (Lt) + ∆
R
t + ∆
E.
Again ψG is a government bailout as a fraction of losses, which again we set to 25%. Now
∆E are private equity injections. The difference here is that ∆E is additive rather than
multiplicative. The calibration procedure is the same with ∆E replacing ψE.
The alternate law of motion for lender equity yields broadly similar results. The lender
rationing effect is weakened and more of the bust is explained by an exogenous change in
prices, but quantitatively these changes are minute.
Table 19 shows the parameters for the model. One can see that they are similar, although
afrac and Cι are both somewhat smaller. The 27 percent fall in a¯ implies that prices fall
permanently by 13.26 percent nationally due to the valuation shock, up from 11.91 percent
in the main text.
Table 20 repeats the decomposition of effects in Table 5. The model without any de-
fault account explains 56.56% of the peak-to-trough decline in non-distressed prices. The
foreclosure flag effect explains an additional 22.68%, and the choosey buyer effect explains
an additional 3.40%. Lender rationing explains the remaining 17.36%. Relative to the main
text, the foreclosure flag and choosey buyer effects are similar, lender rationing explains
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Table 20: Decomposition of Effects in National Model for Alternate Law of Motion
Statistic No Liquidity No Rationing, No Full
(Peak to Trough Unless Indicated) Shocks No Choosey Buyer Rationing Model
Price Index 44.81% 76.67% 78.32% 100%
Non-Distressed Price Index 56.57% 79.24% 82.64% 100%
Non-Distressed Sales Volume 58.01% 62.02% 82.57% 100%
Average REO Share 0% 69.38% 70.92% 100%
Total Foreclosures 0% 82.01% 83.11% 100%
Note: Each cell indicates the fraction of the full model accounted for each column’s model relative to the full
model. No rationing turns off the lender rationing effect by setting Pt = 1 . No rationing and no choosey
buyer additionally turns off the choosey buyer effect by altering the buyer’s value function so she does not
take into account the possibility of meeting an REO seller, which leaves only the foreclosure flag effect. No
default turns off all of the effects and entirely eliminates default. This table uses the alternate law of motion.
roughly 5% less of the decline in non-distressed prices, and the model without default ex-
plains roughly 5% more. Table 21 evaluates the robustness of the role of each effect in
reducing non-distressed prices. Again, the results are largely robust across a range of cali-
brations.
Finally, the cross-cities analysis looks similar with the alternate law of motion for lender
equity. Figure 8 repeats the analysis in Figure 5 and shows our simulated results from the
baseline model with the alternate law of motion against actual data for 96 CBSAs (black
dots) and the national model (red X). Table 22 repeats the analysis in Table 6. As with
the main text, the model fits well, with the data points clustering around the 45-degree line
across the spectrum of price declines. Indeed, when we regress the simulated data on the
actual data we get a coefficient of 0.995, and we cannot statistically reject a coefficient of
one and an intercept of zero. Panel B shows the fraction of the housing stock foreclosed
upon over eight years. This is a moment used in the national calibration, so the national
model is fits almost exactly, but it is not a target for the cross-section. Nonetheless, when
we regress the simulated data on the real data, we get a coefficient of .981 and we cannot
reject a coefficient of one and an intercept of zero. The limited heterogeneity in our model
thus does a good job capturing the variation in default across cities. The other results in
Table 22 are similar to the main text as well, as are the contrast between the model with
and without default across cities as in Figure 10.
D.3 Cross-Cities Calibration With No Heterogeneity in Unem-
ployment By CBSA
In the main text CBSAs differ along three dimensions: the initial loan balance distribution,
the size of the permanent price decline, and their long-term unemployment rate, which scales
the liquidity shock series. In this appendix, we remove heterogeneity in the liquidity series.
This pedagogical exercise is meant to show how important it is to include heterogeneity in
long-term unemployment by CBSA.
Tables 23 and 9 and Figures 10 and 24 reproduce Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 5 and 6 in the
main text for this specification. Removing this heterogeneity does reduce the quantitative fit
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Table 21: Robustness: Decomposition of Non-Distressed Price Index Effects in National
Model for Alternate Law of Motion
Changed Model Rel No No Rationing, No Full
Calibration Target to Data Default No Choosey Buyer Rationing Model
Baseline 99.72% 56.57% 79.24% 82.64% 100%
10% REO Discount 108.02% 56.80% 75.45% 78.02% 100%
γr = 1/12 105.93% 59.84% 81.87% 85.29% 100%
σ = 1/(2 ∗ 52) 99.97% 59.48% 75.63% 78.79% 100%
σ = 1/(3 ∗ 52) 99.52% 52.26% 81.39% 84.97% 100%
ζ = .7 100.90% 62.56% 81.42% 84.54% 100%
Cap Ratio 12.5% 102.13% 58.11% 80.32% 83.70% 100%
Note: Each row is for a different robustness check in which one calibration target is changed as indicated
in the first column. Each cell indicates the fraction of the full model’s peak to trough decline in the non-
distressed price index accounted for each column’s model relative to the full model. No rationing turns off
the lender rationing effect by setting Pt = 1 . No rationing and no choosey buyer additionally turns off the
choosey buyer effect by altering the buyer’s value function so she does not take into account the possibility
of meeting an REO seller, which leaves only the foreclosure flag effect. No default turns off all of the effects
and entirely eliminates default. This table uses the alternate law of motion.
Figure 8: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data for Alternate Law of Motion
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Note: Each panel shows scatter plots of data vs simulation results for 96 CBSAs in regression analysis. The
red X represents the national simulation and each black dot is a CBSA. The 45-degree line illustrates a
perfect match between the model and the data. The variable being plotted shown in each plot’s title. The
data is described in the appendix. The calibration methodology, which fits the cross-cities model only to the
aggregate price decline in panel A, is described in text. The price decline is the maximum peak-to-trough
change, while the fraction foreclosed which is the total from 2006 to 2013. This figure uses the alternate law
of motion.
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Table 22: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
Reg Coef of 0.995 1.351 0.849 0.981 0.449
Data on Model (0.062) (0.085) (0.092) (0.068) (0.056)
R2 0.735 0.735 0.484 0.695 0.424
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. The comparisons
show the slope term of a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. This table uses the alternate law of motion.
Figure 9: No Unemployment Heterogeneity: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
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Note: Scatter plots of data vs simulation results for 96 CBSAs in regression analysis. The red X represents
the national simulation and each black dot is a CBSA. The 45-degree line illustrates a perfect match between
the model and the data. The variable being plotted shown in each plot’s title. The calibration methodology,
which fits the cross-cities model only to the aggregate price decline in panel A, is described in text. The
price decline is the maximum peak-to-trough change while the fraction foreclosed which is the total from
2006 to 2013.
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Table 23: No Unemployment Heterogeneity: Cross-CBSA Simulations vs. Data
Mean REO % %
Variable ∆ logP ∆ log (P
nd
) Share Foreclose Convert
National Data -0.388 -0.298 0.190 8.34 4.35
National Model -0.388 -0.289 0.191 8.34 7.38
Reg Coef of 0.984 1.298 0.758 1.016 0.353
Data on Model (0.073) (0.091) (0.109) (0.091) (0.053)
R2 0.667 0.688 0.349 0.579 0.341
Note: Each column shows a comparison of the model and data for the given variable. The top comparisons
compare the data and model for the national simulation. The bottom comparisons show the slope term of
a regression of the actual data on the model simulated data. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Figure 10: No Unemployment Heterogeneity Boom vs. Bust in Baseline and No Default
Models
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A. Baseline Model
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B. Model With No Default
No Default
Quadratic Fit, No Default
Quadratic Fit, Data
Note: The left panel shows the size of the boom vs. the model simulated data for the baseline calibrated
model with default, while the right panel shows the same plot for the no default model. The black solid line
is a best quadratic fit. The red dashed line shows the best quadratic fit to the actual data.
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Table 24: No Unemployment Heterogeneity Model vs. Data: Interaction of Size of Boom
With High LTV Share
∆ log (P)× Z LTV > 80% ∆ log (P) ∆ log (P
nd
) Mean REO Share % Foreclosed
Baseline -0.700 -0.139 0.298 0.154
(.018)*** (0.008)*** (0.018)*** (.008)***
No Default -.102 -.102
(.004)*** (.004)***
Data -0.310 -0.336 139 0.205 0.235
(0.123)** (0.113)*** (0.075)*** (0.054)***
Notes: * = 10% Significance, ** = 5% Significance *** = 1% significance. All standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Each column shows estimates of (1) with the constant suppressed. Pnd is a non-distressed
only price index. The mean REO share of sales volume is the average from 2008 to 2012, and the fraction
foreclosed is the fraction of the housing stock foreclosed upon over the first 8 years of the downturn. All
data is from CoreLogic and described in the appendix. Data is for 97 largest CBSAs excluding Syracuse NY,
Detroit MI, Warren MI, and, for columns 3-5, Birmingham AL. All dependent variables are peak-to-trough
maximums with the exception of percentage foreclosed upon.
of the model somewhat. The r-squared of regressing the actual data on the simulated data
for aggregate price is 0.67 rather than 0.74 with heterogeneity by CBSA. The r-squared for
other variables falls as well. The regression coefficients are also further from one. However,
the non-linearity in boom-size relative to the size of the bust is quite similar in Figure 10
and Figure 6, suggesting that heterogeneity in long-term unemployment does not drive this
non-linearity
We conclude that adding heterogeneity in liquidity shocks by CBSA based on the CBSA’s
unemployment rate helps the quantitative fit but is not crucial for generating the non-
linearity in the model.
E Policy Appendix
E.1 Costs of Government Policies
In the text, we report per-household costs of various foreclosure policies.
The present-value cost of government equity injections is computed as:
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
ψGιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V dt − Lt
)
dG (Lt) ,
where ψG is the fraction of book losses covered by the government. Recall that
ιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V dt − Lt
)
dG (Lt)
are the total book losses experienced by the lender in a given period t, where ιt is the
incidence of liquidity shocks, only homeowners who are underwater default, and V dt is the
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value that the lender can recover from the home. We set r = β−1 − 1.
The cost of financing the principal reduction is equal to the cost of the baseline 25%
equity injection plus the cost of principal reductions of Φ dollars up to an LTV limit of 115.
The cost of the principal reduction is given by:
ˆ
min (Φ,L0 − 1.15V n0 ) 1 [L0 > 1.15V n0 ] dG (L0) ,
where G (L0) is the initial loan balance distribution and V
n
0 is the price a homeowner can
receive for her home at the onset of the crisis.
Finally, we describe how we implement the policy in which the government purchases
distressed homes from lenders and then holds them off the market for a period of time. First,
we introduce a new state variable vgt , denoting the stock of homes held by the government.
The laws of motion for vgt and the adjusted law of motion for v
d
t become:
vdt+1 = σgv
g
t + v
d
t
[
1− qs (θt)
(
1− Ft
(
hdt
))]
vgt+1 = ιt
∑
i
lit1
[
Lit > V
n
t
]
+ (1− σg) vgt ,
where σg is the rate at which the government re-introduces homes to the market. Finally,
we let
V gt = md + β (1− σg)EtV gt+1 + βσgEtV dt+1
denote the value of a home in the government stock. Note that the government pays the
flow cost md, reflecting the higher depreciation associated with vacant homes. Upon re-
introducing the home to the market, the government receives V dt , the value of a distressed
home. The present-value cost of this policy to the government along the perfect foresight
path is:
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
ιtlt
ˆ
1 [Lt > V
n
t ]
(
V gt − V dt
)
dG (Lt) .
E.2 Payment Reductions
In this appendix, we consider policies which offer payment relief by subsidizing lower interest
payments holding the principal balance fixed. This is a policy intervention that our model is
not as well-suited to consider since we abstract from household balance sheets. Nonetheless,
we can use results from the empirical literature on how payment reductions affect the inci-
dence of default in partial equilibrium and feed this into the model to get some understanding
of the aggregate effect of the policy, taking into account equilibrium effects. Because this
exercise is not fully internal to our model, though, it is more difficult to compare to the other
policies we consider on even footing.
Specifically, we use results from Fuster and Willen (2017), who provide quasi-experimental
empirical evidence on the effect of payment reductions on default by exploiting plausibly
exogenous differences in the timing of rate resets among a sample of homeowners with ALT-A
hybrid adjustable rate mortgages between 2005-2008. They document that a 0.50% reduction
in the interest rate reduces the default hazard by 10% while a 1.0% reduction leads to a 20%
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Table 25: Effects of Payment Reductions
Rate Reduction Decline in Cι ∆ logPnd Total Foreclosures
No Rate Reduction 0% -0.289 8.34%
0.5% Rate Reduction 10% -0.274 7.51%
1.0% Rate Reduction 20% -0.259 6.67%
2.0% Rate Reduction 40% -0.231 5.00%
Notes: The table shows the peak-to-trough decline in log non-distressed prices and total foreclosures from
2006 to 2013 under each policy intervention.
decline in the default hazard. We introduce this evidence into our model by assuming that
the government covers a certain percentage of the interest that underwater homeowners owe
to lenders and reducing Cι, the scaling parameter of the liquidity shock series ιt = CιUnempt
and hence the default hazard, by the amount indicated by Fuster and Willen’s analysis.
Our results are in Table 25. A 0.5% rate reduction leads to a 5.27% smaller non-distressed
price decline, a 1.0% rate reduction to a 10.40% smaller decline, and a 2.0% rate reduction to
a 21.06% smaller decline. Intuitively, payment reductions empirically reduce the incidence
of default, which when added to the model reduces the severity of the equilibrium price-
default spiral. Note that this policy is imperfectly targeted as with principal forgiveness.
Homeowners who would never have defaulted receive benefits, which decreases the cost-
effectiveness of the policy.
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